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Abstract 
 
The dissertation consists of two essays.  
 
The first essay studies governance structures and their effectiveness for start-up companies and 
their survival. We utilize data from the Kauffman Survey, which tracks a sample of firms from 
their inceptions through their first eight years of existence. We hypothesize and find evidence 
that a startup's governance system affects its survivability as well as its performance. We show 
that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the performance 
of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables; the presence of one or more 
independent board member on the board, the separation between the person holding the CEO 
position and the chair of the board. From the startup survival perspective, we show that the 
presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between CEO and board 
chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up's longevity. 
 
The second essay studies the direct and indirect relations between Governance and firm survival 
and performance through Entrepreneurial Orientation. Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is 
defined as the attributes, including innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking attitude, 
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness, that a business organization displays at the time 
of entry. Several researchers have studied the linkage between EO and organizational 
performance as well as the survival rate of new firms and find conflicting results. Reasons for the 
contradictory results might very well be the way the researchers have defined the EO attributes 
and the data source they use which is based on subjective responses. In the hopes of reducing 
inconsistent results, we propose that it is the governance factors that influence the performance 
and survival of these firm via mediating role of entrepreneurial orientation. Governance factors 
remove the definition as well as data measurement problems.  By using the 8-year longitudinal 
data of 4928 startups, we show that governance system significantly impacts a start-up’s 
performance and survival via entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
JEL Classification: M13, L26, G34 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurial Finance; Privately-held Companies; Governance Structure; Start-up 
survival; Entrepreneurial Orientation; Startup Performance.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Governance Structure and the Startup survival 
 
1. Introduction 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that a privately-held firm managed by a single owner 
will not face agency costs because the conflicts of interest between the owner and the manager do 
not exist.  Although a private firm is more vulnerable when it is owned by multiple owner and 
managers, the problem can be resolved efficiently as the owners practice economically more 
rational behavior. Thus, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the formal governance 
mechanism of a private firm is not only unnecessary but may detract the firm from having 
efficient performance. According to Uhlaner, Wright, and Huse (2007), the shift from the founder-
owner managed ﬁrm to a multiple ownership structure in most cases will result in immediate 
demands for more monitoring which in turn, requires more formal governance mechanisms. 
 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001 (hereafter SLDB) argue that private owners’ 
preferences are expressed in economic as well as non-economic terms. According to SLDB, a 
major source of the non-economically motivated behavior is altruism which “allows the 
individual to simultaneously satisfy both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic 
(self-regarding) preferences” (p. 102). They empirically test this proposition through a sample of 
family firms. SLDB (2001) suggest that a good corporate governance system is needed for private 
firms as well to reign in the non-economic preferences that are likely to negatively affect a firm’s 
performance.  
 
In conclusion, the two theories offer opposite implications regarding the role of 
governance for private firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that a governance system is 
not only unnecessary but may lead to reduction in the firm’s value, while SLDB (2001) suggest 
that a governance system is not only necessary but augments a private firm’s value. We contribute 
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to this debate by examining the effect of the governance system on the survivability and 
performance of US start-up firms.  
 
Despite the presence of a wide range of governance studies and its impact on larger firms' 
performance, the governance patterns of newly created firms remain relatively unexplored. A 
principal reason for the paucity of research has been the unavailability of reliable data. These 
firms are not required to disclose financial information since they do not offer debt or equity to 
the public. In addition, since a startup firm is not subject to SEC regulations, it is not required to 
maintain any specific governance structure (for example, the presence of a Board of Directors 
overseeing firm management). Opportunely, a recent and unique data set, the Kauffman Firm 
Survey (KFS) provides data, among other items, on ownership structure, board structure, and the 
ways start-ups meet their financing needs. The KFS dataset is the largest longitudinal study 
conducted on new businesses1. The KFS is a panel dataset that spans eight years and allows us 
to study the governance behavior of newly created firms by examining the control choices that 
small firms make when they launch and ask whether any patterns of governance emerge from 
the data that may impact such firms' survival. The primary issue that we address in this paper is 
the impact, if any, of the governance system on a start-up firm's performance and survivability. 
 
Our study builds upon the analysis conducted in Lowrey (2009), which examined the 
dynamics and characteristics of startup firms from the Kauffman Firm Survey from 2004 until 
2006. Our study provides an extension to Lowrey (2009) by using start-up firm data over a longer 
period of time as well as focusing on the governance factors that affect a firms’ survival through 
a series of logit regressions. Our results indicate that the presence of one or more independent 
board member(s), the separation between CEO and board chair, and external funding are 
effective factors that promote a start-up's longevity.  We find that cross-sectional variations in the 
ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. We do find that firm 
governance structure impacts firm performance, and this holds with our robustness checks that 
                                                 
1 About the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). (n.d.). Retrieved March 05, 2018, from 
https://www.kauffman.org/microsites/kfs/about-the-kfs 
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measure firm performance through Return on Assets (ROA), sales growth, and employment 
growth. Our results contribute to the understanding of what types of firm governance systems 
effect firm performance and survival. These findings are beneficial to start-up managers, 
investors, and organizations that foster entrepreneurship, such as business incubators and 
accelerators. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. First, it reviews the relevant literature 
for governance in startup firms before developing hypotheses on how the different governance 
patterns impact the startup survival and performance. Next, it describes the research design of 
the empirical study. Thereafter, we present and explain the results. Finally, we summarize and 
conclude.   
 
2. Governance of Start-up Firms 
2.1. Governance and Firms Survival 
 
The literature on organization demographics highlights that newer and smaller firms are 
less likely to survive (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). While start-up firms cannot do much in terms 
of their age, but they can avoid the liability of smallness through rapid growth. Past growth 
provides a firm to increase the likelihood of future survival. Thus, firms benefit from a sustained 
growth pattern. Growth and survival analyses have been relatively well covered in the literature 
on firm dynamics. Both areas share common variables such as size, experience, and owners' 
characteristics just to cite a few. Gibrat's Law states that a firm's growth rate is independent of its 
size. Previous studies provide empirical evidence that suggests that Gibrat's Law may be wrong 
or at least wrong to a certain extent (Kumar 1985, Evans 1987, Hall 1987). 
A limited number of models have been developed to explain these age effects. Cooley and 
Quadrini (2001) adds a theoretical model of size (equity) and age effects on firm's dynamics and 
provides a significant contribution to the literature on firm dynamics. They contribute to the 
literature by simultaneously taking both firm size and age dependency into consideration, after 
they introduce financial frictions into the model. Cooley and Quadrini state that debt matters and 
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causes of firm failure. The model depicted by Cooley and Quadrini predicts that newer firms tend 
to take on more debt which increases the profit volatility, thus increasing firm failure. 
The age hypothesis cannot be tested directly using the KFS since all firms are part of the 
same cohort together with the KFS being a relatively new dataset. Instead, it is tested for indirectly 
through the debt hypothesis. Financial conditions, which include debt, equity, and leverage have 
also been a vital part of a firms' dynamics in the literature. KFS offers a full range of data for every 
life stage of the financial health of the company. Also, Cooley and Quadrini find that leverage 
that is described as debt over equity decreases with the firm's size since smaller firms take on 
more debt. When relating these findings to firm size and survival literature (probability of exit 
decreases with size), we can assume that the probability of a firm exit should decrease with 
additional leverage. Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) study the initial financing conditions of the 
firm effects on survival. They argue that probability of survival is increasing with initial external 
debt, although a negative correlation exists between initial bank loans and survival. On the other 
hand, Huynh et al. (2008) suggest that a firm's exit probability is increasing with leverage. 
Thompson (2005) examines how selection bias can occur when assessing firm quality, and 
provided a framework for tackling this issue. Because of this, I test for the effects of quality using 
years of experience in the industry, as suggested by Thompson (2005). 
 
2.2. Board of Directors 
Board composition is determined using Weisbach’s (1988) trichotomous classification 
scheme. A director who is a full-time employee of the company is classified as an inside director. 
A director who is neither an employee nor has extensive dealings with the company is referred 
to as an outside director. All other directors, who are not full-time employees but have 
relationships with the company (for example, family relationships, consultants) are designated 
as “gray” directors or “affiliates.” Director classification is determined by reading biographies in 
annual reports, analyzing related party transactions, and by inference from the definition of 
family firm.  
The agency theory and resource dependency theory provide fundamental support for an 
appropriate BOD to control agency cost and provide valuable resources to the firm in the form of 
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finance and capital, links to key suppliers, customers, and significant stakeholders (see Jackling 
& Johl, 2009). Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that a larger board has advantages such as 
sharing of management and expertise and the capacity to oppose any illogical decisions made by 
the CEO while Jensen (1993) argues that a larger board creates agency costs, gives rise to free 
rider problems, delays in making good decisions and in actively supervising the firm (see also 
Goodstein, Gautam &Boeker, 1994; Shaw, 1976). 
Daily and Dalton (1992) find that founders or entrepreneurial firms may use outside 
directors to obtain desired firm growth. Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, and Dennis (2000) find that 
small private firms adopt outside directors primarily to appease external owners and utilize the 
services and resource benefits offered by outside directors. Dutia (2014) supports startups to 
establish boards into their governance structure, because "A well-functioning board's activities 
can result in a well-timed exit strategy that creates an opportunity to sell the company, make an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO), or further scale and grow the business. Gabrielsson (2003) contends 
that the benefits of SMEs establishing a board of directors and further research is needed to 
provide a deeper understanding of how a board of directors can contribute to the SME 
performance. The involvement and formal structure of the board is vital for the board's ability to 
perform effectively Gabrielsson and Winlund (2000). 
Fried, Bruton, and Hisrich (1998) provide evidence supporting a relationship between 
board involvement and performance. Johannisson and Huse (2000) state that the 
"professionalization" of the board enforces managerialism. Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003) 
propose a theory that, "board composition and, consequently, firm performance are a reflection 
of both the firm's life cycle stage and the relative power of the CEO and external financiers at the 
time of founding." Politis and Landström (2002) discuss how firms must balance corporate 
governance with the ability to access required resources and maintain control to be able to make 
fast strategic decisions. 
 
2.3. Ownership 
Brunninge, Nordqvist, and Wiklund (2007) find that governance variables relate to 
ownership, the board of directors, and management have an impact on strategic change and 
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emphasizes the importance of analyzing the interaction effects of these governance mechanisms. 
Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino (2002) examine private firm's agency problems, which may stem 
from the firm's ownership structure. Uhlaner, Floren, and Geerlings (2007) focus on the 
governance structure of privately-held firms and finds that owner commitment has an impact on 
firm performance, which supports stewardship theory and organizational social capital theory. 
Owners have more of a personal stake in the success of a firm, while a professional manager 
incentive is limited to what is stated in the employment contract (Alcorn, 1982). Nordqvist (2005) 
proposes that three processes shape ownership in family firms are, "channeling ownership 
through formal intentions and vision, channeling ownership through informal interaction, and 
channeling ownership through symbolic embodiment in the strategic work. Daily and Dollinger 
(1992) survey a sample of private firms that are professionally-managed or family firms and find 
that family firms tend to be smaller and younger than professionally-managed firms. 
The decision of what business entity a start-up will become provides a framework for 
ownership as well as the liabilities the business owners will be liable for. Malch, Robinson, and 
Radcliffe (2006) explore the different types of legal issues that the various business types are 
subject to and find that certain issues are relevant to all new business ventures, certain issues are 
relevant to specific types of ventures, and specific business categories. The business entity 
decision may be influenced by the entrepreneur’s attorney or accountant. Blair and Marcum 
(2015) discuss both the advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the main business 
entities that start-ups become and provide partial evidence that supports that attorneys and 
accountants advise entrepreneurs to select their business entity based on liability yet also provide 
evidence that accountants focus on advising entrepreneurs more on the basis of firm taxation. We 
examine what types of business entities survive by examining Sole Proprietorships, Limited 
Liability Corporations (LLCs), S Corporations, C Corporations, and Partnerships.  
 
2.4. Debt Financing sources 
Research argues that personal guarantees and personal collateral must often be posted to 
secure financing for startups (Moon, 2009; Avery, Bostic and Samalyk, 1998; Mann, 1998). Robb 
and Robinson (2010) show that the heavy reliance of new firms on external debt especially bank 
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loans underscores the importance of well-functioning credit markets for the success of nascent 
business activity as the financing agreements of bank loans Promote higher quality firm 
performance and more sustainable growth. Because startups rely so extensively on the outside 
debt as a source of their capital, they are especially more sensitive to changes in the bank lending 
conditions, perhaps more than suggested based on accounts of entrepreneurial finance that focus 
on the importance of informal capital. 
 
3. The Relation between Governance and Performance 
 
Some governance features may be motivated by incentive-based economic models of 
managerial behavior. Broadly speaking, these models fall into two categories. In agency models, 
a divergence in the interests of managers and shareholders causes managers to take actions that 
are costly to shareholders. Contracts cannot preclude this activity if shareholders are unable to 
observe managerial behavior directly, but ownership by the manager may be used to induce 
managers to act in a manner that is consistent with the interest of shareholders. Grossman and 
Hart (1983) describe this problem. Adverse selection models are motivated by the hypothesis of 
differential ability that cannot be observed by shareholders. In this setting, ownership may be 
used to induce revelation of the manager's private information about cash flow or her ability to 
generate cash flow, which cannot be observed directly by shareholders. A general treatment is 
provided by Myerson (1987). In the above scenarios, some features of corporate governance may 
be interpreted as a characteristic of the contract that governs relations between shareholders and 
managers. Governance is affected by the same unobservable features of managerial behavior or 
ability that are linked to ownership and performance. 
 
The board processes have a substantive impact on firm performance, and meetings are 
necessary to execute board task effectiveness (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). When the board of 
directors meets frequently, they are more likely to discuss the concerned issues and monitor the 
management more effectively, thereby performing their duties with better coordination and in 
harmony with shareholders' interests (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Consistent with this notion, 
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Conger et al. (1998) suggested that board meeting time is an important resource for improving 
the board effectiveness and, thus, better decision-making. But, there are also costs attached to 
board meetings, which include expenses such as managerial time, travel expense, directors' fees 
and other resources (Vafeas, 1999). Both Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) discuss the 
limited time available for meetings may not be sufficient for enough dialogue among directors. 
Notably, Jensen (1993) argues that boards should be relatively inactive and are required to 
become active only in the times of crisis. 
 
There is also an ongoing debate on CEO duality and firm performance, but the results 
from the empirical studies are conflicting (Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Balinga et al., 
1996; Coles and Hesterly, 2000; Elsayed, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 2002). Bhagat and Bolton (2002) 
have found the CEO–Chair separation to be significantly positively correlated with firm's 
operating performance. Boyd (1995) also indicated that CEO duality actually improves firm 
performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) also supported separation of CEO and chair positions, 
as the firms opting for independent leadership outperformed the firms relying on CEO duality. 
Some authors found no significant difference between the firms with CEO duality and those 
without it (Daily and Dalton, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998). In fact, Daily and Dalton (1997) suggested 
that separation of CEO and board chair positions results in a misdirected effort. 
 
In addition, ownership control and institutional ownership are also important 
determinants of firm performance. An example is Agyemang and Castellini (2015), which focuses 
on how ownership control and board control systems operate in corporate firms in emerging 
economies, such Ghana, and assume that these systems are an integral part for enhancing good 
corporate governance practices in emerging countries. Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) find that 
institutional shareholding enhances market valuation. In contrast, Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) 
investigate the role of corporate governance indices on firm performance (earnings per share, 
return on assets [ROA], return on equity [ROE]) and find that the there is no positive association 
with the presence of institutional investors and firm performance. Overall, the empirical findings 
on corporate governance and firm performance have been very mixed. On the one hand, several 
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studies estimated that better corporate governance significantly enhances firm performance 
(Brickley and James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; 
Lee et al., 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 2000; Chung et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2003; 
Beiner et al., 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Black et al., 2006). On the other hand, some others 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002; Bauer et al., 2004) reported an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. There are also studies which reported no 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Park and Shin, 2003; Prevost et al., 2002; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003). 
 
4. Survival vs. Performance 
 
The growth and profitability path of firms of new firms  (startups) is vital for management 
theory (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997). Since in Penrose (1959), who develop the original 
"theory of the growth of the firm" which states that the managerial resources play a pivotal role, 
where several factors affect growth. Certain factors, such as population density or market forces, 
are considered to be external to the organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Porter, 1980),  while 
others factors are internal, such as capabilities, culture, or strategy (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; 
Boeker, 1997; Garnsey, 1998; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; Canals, 2000, chapter 3). In research on 
entrepreneurship, previous studies examine the characteristics that are specific to entrepreneurial 
firms (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). 
 
Both the organizations and economics literature offer rationales for previous growth 
having the ability to increase the probability of future growth. This forms the growth momentum 
hypothesis. The literature on organization demographics highlights that firms which are newer 
and smaller in size are less likely to survive (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Industry statistics from 
Dun & Bradstreet (1998) also support the liabilities of newness and smallness. While startups 
cannot do anything about their age, they can avoid this liability of small size by rapid growth. 
Past growth will enable a firm to increase the likelihood of their future survival. Therefore, firms 
will benefit from a sustained growth pattern. The momentum that is implicit in this continuous 
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growth pattern can be based on different sources of advantage. Some of these advantages are 
external to the organization and related to both the density and institutional characteristics of the 
market niche that the firm is competing in (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). New firm growth may 
be based on the choice of the right niche where it can be successful. The organizational literature 
also indicates that forces internal to the organization may drive sustained growth. Internal 
capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) can provide new firms with the conditions needed to 
grow and succeed. 
A strand of literature promoting experience as an important contributor to survival has 
been developed. Research has tackled two main areas pertaining to firms' experience. First, past 
studies find the effects on owners' pre-entry experience to be a persistent determinant of 
performance in the years following entry. Second, the more related the experience is to the 
industry in which the firm operates the more valuable it is. Thompson studies both effects in the 
shipbuilding industry, and his findings reinforce Klepper and Simons' (2000) suggestion that 
firms with more experience in related fields of the industry perform better than de novo entrants 
with less experience. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1. Hypothesis 
Based on the previous study review, we test the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Controlling for the firm's size and industry affiliation, the better the governance, the better a 
firm's performance. 
We test the impact of these governance variables on startup performance measured by its return 
on equity (ROE) as; 
The governance factors included in this paper are: 
• Independent Director on the Board: The dummy takes on a value of 1 if the firm's board has 
an independent member, it is 0 otherwise. According to Daily and Dalton (1992), founders 
of entrepreneurial firms should use outside directors to obtain desired firm growth and 
increase their survivability chances  
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• Duality - Separation between CEO and Board Chair: The dummy takes on a value of 1, if the 
two positions are held by two different persons, it takes on a value of 0 otherwise. 
• Robb and Robinson (2010) show that the heavy reliance of new firms on external debt 
especially bank loans promote higher quality firm performance and more sustainable 
growth.   
o Bank Business Loan or Line of Credit as % of Total Debt 
o Government Loans as a % of Total Equity 
o Bank Loan + Line of Credit % of Total Loan 
o Owner +Insider Loan % of Total Loan 
 
On the second hypothesis, we test the impact of these governance variables on startup 
performance measured by its survival as follow: 
 
H2: Survived startups adopt more efficient governance patterns than non-survived startups. 
    Using the governance variables mentioned below and the startup survival as a binary variable 
of 1 or 0. The second hypothesis tests the impact of the governance structure on the startup 
survival. 
We use the same governance variables mentioned above and survival as the dependent variable. 
 
5.2. Variables 
Governance variables: The following variables are the main ones used to measure 
governance in the startup firms: ownership structure, board structure, and financing sources. 
• Ownership structure is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is 
owned by a single owner (i.e., proprietor) and zero if the firm is owned by multiple 
owners; 
• Board structure is proxied by the presence of one or more independent directors 
on the board. Outsiders on the board of directors is any director who is unrelated 
to the family. We use a dummy variable to capture the essence of this variable: it 
takes a value of 1 if the board has an independent director, zero otherwise.  
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• For sources of financing, we employ several proxies: 
o Ratio of debt to equity= Measured using the median leverage of all firms and 
ranking firms as above and below the median. 
o Financing via owners 
o Financing via bank loan 
o Financing via government finance; and  
o Financing via venture capital 
• Firm Size: The impact of the firm's size on the performance and survival has been 
significantly proven in many studies. As the greater size give the firm greater 
opportunity for economies of scale which in turn lowers the cost of capital and 
improve the performance. The firm size may also have a negative impact on the 
performance, because the bigger the size; the greater is the information asymmetry 
which leads to more agency costs and less performance efficiency.  The effect of 
the firm size on the performance can either be positive or negative.  Based on 
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) who added a theoretical model of size (equity) and 
age effects on firm's dynamics, firm size and age provide a significant impact on 
its performance and survival.  We measure asset size by the logarithm of total 
assets of the firm, and the number of full-time employees for robustness. 
• Industry dummy: As the Kaufmann survey is more focused on the tech industry, 
and as the firm performance depends on the nature of its activity.   The dummy 
variable takes a value of one if a firm operates in the technology sector, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
5.3. The Model 
The first hypothesis H1 is tested into two ways; the first is using the direct regression of 
performance on the other variables,  
 
ROEij = b0j + b1j OWNi + b2j DUALi +  b3j BOARDi +  b4j OWNEQi + b45 GOVEQi + b6j VENi 
+ b7j BANKi  +  b8j LOG(Size)i + b9j Industryi + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
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 The second approach used to test the second hypothesis is the 2sls regression based on ROE is 
adopted as a measure of performance. However, extant literature highlights potential 
endogeneity problems surrounding regression analyses of corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance. Thus, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) propose the use of 2SLS regressions in the 
context of endogenously determined corporate governance mechanisms. The method involves, 
first, estimating ordinary least squares (OLS) predictions for each endogenous regressor. Second, 
each of the predictions is regressed on ROE together to determine consistent estimates for each 
endogenous regressor. This method allows for the interdependence and alternative use of all of 
the governance mechanisms. 
To test H2, an analogous method to that of Agrawal and Knoeber is applied to a restricted 
subsample that includes only the survived firms. A 2SLS regression is estimated by regressing 
five endogenous corporate governance variables on ROE. Predictions for each of the endogenous 
independent variables is estimated from the following equations: 
First stage regression:  
 
 
OWNi0∑  
1
𝑗≠𝑂𝑊𝑁 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij  
DEBTi0∑  
1
𝑗≠𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij  
BODi0∑  
1
𝑗≠𝐵𝑂𝐷 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij  
DUALi0∑  
1
𝑗≠𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij 
LEVi0∑  
1
𝑗≠𝐿𝐸𝑉 jVarij 8STDEVi 6SIZEi 7INDi ij 
 
Second stage regression: 
 
 ROEi 0 1 OWNi 2 DEBTi 3 BODi 4LEVi5 DUALi6 SIZEi6 INDi ij 
 
where the first five independent variables (excluding the constant term) are the predicted values 
from regressions 1 through 5. If the coefficients in the equation of second stage regression are 
 14 
significant, the null in H2 will be rejected: there is evidence to suggest that survived firms adopt 
suboptimal corporate governance structures. In other words, any significance in the model's 
independent variables that persists into the second stage is inconsistent with wealth 
maximization. That is, significant positive coefficients suggest that increasing the use of the 
governance mechanism would improve performance, whereas negative coefficients suggest that 
reducing the use of the governance mechanism would lead to performance improvements. If the 
mechanism is used optimally, it should not be significantly related to performance in the second 
stage (its coefficient should not be significantly different from zero). 
 
 
To test the second hypothesis of governance variables effect on survival, we use model that is 
similar to the one used in Anderson et al. (1998) in the context of diversification and corporate 
governance. The first set of regressions is as follows: 
 
SURVIVALij = b0j + b1j OWNi + b2j DUALi +  b3j BOARDi +  b4j OWNEQi + b45 GOVEQi 
+ b6j VENi + b7j BANKi  +  b8j LOG(Size)i + b9j Industryi + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
 
where the subscript i denotes the firm- level observation for each variable in 2004 to 2011 and 
Governance represents each of the possible corporate governance variables that may be used as 
dependent variables (ownership, board composition, Leverage and debt financing source). 
 
6. Data 
 
We utilize Kauffman Survey Data which tracks a sample of firms from their inceptions 
through their first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from 2004 until 
2013. The data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy, innovation, 
organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owner-operators are 
defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the day-to-day 
operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating assistance" 
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(Farhat and Robb, 2014). Several studies have used KFS data to further understand new firm 
characteristics, such as analyzing the financing of new firms (Coleman and Robb, 2009; 2011; Cole 
and Sokolyk, 2013), comparisons of different types of new firms (Welsh, Desplaces, and Davis, 
2011), and firm survival (Robb and Reynolds, 2009). 
 
Robb et al. (2009) and Ballou et al. (2007) provide thorough descriptions of the sampling 
process used to construct the initial sample. They report that the target population for the survey 
was all new businesses that were started in the 2004 calendar year in the United States 
(representing activity in each of the ﬁfty states plus the District of Columbia). The objective of the 
KFS dataset is to track the progress of their sample from the target population, with the specified 
target population being new firms. A business started in 2004 is deﬁned as a "new, independent 
business that was created by a single person or a team of people, the purchase of an existing 
business, or the purchase of a franchise." Businesses are excluded if they had an EIN, Schedule C 
income, or had paid state unemployment insurance or federal Social Security taxes before or after 
2004. One challenge with developing a sample of startups in the United States is that there is no 
national registry of startups. 
 
The sampling frame for the KFS is based on the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database and 
restricted to businesses (or enterprises) that are reported by D&B as starting in 2004. This database 
is a compilation of data from various sources, including credit bureaus, state oﬃces that register 
some new businesses, and companies (e.g., credit card and shipping companies) that are likely to 
be used by all businesses. Importantly, this is not the same database as the D&B business registry 
available on the Internet; the sample from which our data are drawn contains vastly greater 
coverage of ﬁrms in the United States.  
 
The KFS data includes an oversample of high-tech ﬁrms; thus, all of our analyses use 
sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the frame from which the sample 
was drawn. The practice of oversampling the main subgroup of a population in survey data in 
reaction to a more limited size of a subgroup for a focused interest on a specific subgroup is 
 16 
commonly used in surveys that focus on policy-making. The reason why the Kauffman Survey 
has oversampled high-technology and medium-technology businesses is for improving stand-
alone analysis and comparative analysis precision as well as subgroup cross-sectional and 
longitudinal analysis precision (Farhat and Robb, 2014). The objective of creating the sample of 
the KFS was to interview 5000 firms that were created in 2004. From the 251,282 businesses in the 
Dunn and Bradstreet database, KFS chose a stratified sample of 32,469 firms. Subsequently, MPR 
was capable of finding the location of 29,526 firms from the sample of 32,469 and 16,156 of these 
firms finished the baseline survey. Of these, 11,228 firms were illegible, which left 4,928 firms in 
the final sample. 
 
7. Results 
7.1. Descriptive Statistics  
We report in Table 1 the summary statistics for the KFS firms through the sample survey 
from 2004 till 2011 showing the summary for business characteristics and governance variables. 
Panel A reports the business characteristics. Panel A shows the business characteristics results 
show that the average size of the firms in the sample is $8062 while the maximum is $113,220,  In 
addition, the average ROA ratio in the sample is 5% with a maximum of 21%. While the highest 
ROE is 5% with a maximum of 23%.   
On panel B we report the descriptive statistics of governance variables. The average 
percentage of Government Loans is 46% while bank loan averages at 39%.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the study variables; business characteristics and governance 
variables, through the sample survey from 2004 until 2011 showing the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum. 
Startup Firms 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Business Characteristics  
Employment Growth % 37 12 3 91 
Sales Growth% 34 19 -21 82 
Size in $ 8,062 11,887 3190 113,220 
ROE% 4.0 6.8 -8.2 21 
ROA% 5.0 8.3 -7.3 23 
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Panel B: Governance Variables 
Government Loans % 26 31 11 55 
Bank loan % 49 50 6 67 
credit Line % 44 30 7 78 
Owner + insider loan % 84 56 34 98 
 
In Table 2, we report the descriptive statistics for the firms survived through the sample 
survey from 2004 till 2011 showing the firms that survived, exit and or sold every year. Failed 
firms are the ones going into financial distress by the end of the year. From the total of 4928 firms 
starting in 2004, 5.2% of them exited the market in their first year, 5% the following year, 3.8% in 
2007, 4.3% in 2008. We can conclude that more than 18% of the firms exited the market in their 
first four years of their life, and more than 7% of them were sold or merged in the same period. 
The balance of the start-ups failed.  
 
Table 2: Startup survival by Year from 2004 till 2011 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the firms survived through the sample survey from 2004 until 
2011 showing the firms that survived, exit and or sold every year. We consider a firm as a ‘failed firm’ if 
the firms go into financial distress by the end of the year. 
 
 Survived Exit Sold or merged Failed  
2004 4928 0 0 0 
2005 3998 260 43 627 
2006 3390 247 36 325 
2007 2915 188 36 251 
2008 2606 213 25 71 
2009 2408 141 23 34 
2010 2126 133 20 129 
2011 2007 109 11 0 
 
Figure 1 shows the sample distribution of the start-up firms based on the ownership 
structures. As shown in Figure 1, partnership structure has the highest number of firms with of 
independent directors on its board, as well as owners' finance, bank loans, and venture capital 
finance. While the single owner firms appear to be the highest in terms of government finance.   
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Figure 1: governance variables based on ownership structures 
 
Table 3 provides the survival rate of start-ups based on the legal form of a firm's 
organization. Both in terms of five years survival and seven years of survival, a partnership 
organization survives the most, followed by proprietorships. LLCs are the least survived. The 
survival rate is the highest for the partnership at 86.89 and 73.78 for five and seven years 
respectively. While it is the lowest for the limited liability corporations for 37.98 and 24.42 for five 
and seven years respectively. 
 
Table 3: Survival rate by the form of organization 
Table 3 reflects the survival rate of start-ups based on the legal form of a firm’s organization, which are 
Sole Proprietorships (Sole Prop), Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs), C Corporations (C Corp), S 
Corporations (S Corp), and Partnerships (which include). The survival variables are the number of firms 
that have survived for five years (#Survived (5 years)), the percentage of firms that have survived for 
five years (%Survived (5 years)), the number of firms that have survived for seven years (#Survived (7 
years)), and the percentage of firms that have survived for seven years (%Survived (7 years)). 
 Sole 
Prop 
LLC C Corp S Corp  Partnership 
(Gen Part +LTD part) 
#Start-ups- 1635 1556 440 1039 206 
#Survived (5 years) 982 591 225 531 179 
%Survived (5 years) 60.06 37.98 51.36 51.1 86.89 
# Survived (7 years) 922 380 131 422 152 
%Survived (7 years) 56.39 24.42 29.77 40.61 73.78 
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7.2. Sources of Financing by Organizational Form 
Table 4 shows how different types of start-up organizations fund their investments.  As 
expected, the principal source of financing of the start-ups is equity provides by the owners or their 
immediate family. Equity funding is used by 88% of partnerships compared to 78% of C 
corporations. The second most important source is the debt provided by owners and family 
members of the owners.  This type of funding is most popular with the proprietorship type 
organization: about 56% of this category rely on internal debt. The equity provided by the equity 
seems to be the third most popular funding method. 
 
Table 4: Sources of Financing by Organizations of Start-ups 
Table 4 shows how different types of start-up organizations fund their investments. The legal form of a firm’s 
organization, which are Sole Proprietorships (Sole Prop), Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs), C 
Corporations (C Corp), S Corporations (S Corp), and Partnerships (including general partnership and limited 
partnership). The variables for financing sourcing are Owner Equity (Owner EQ), Insider Equity (Insider EQ), 
Owner Debt, Insider Debt, Business Bank Loan, Personal Bank Loan by Owners, Government Business Loan 
(Gov Business loan), Government Loans (Gov Loans), Venture Capital, and Business Equity (Business Eq). 
 Sole 
Prop 
(%) 
LLC 
(%) 
C 
Corp 
(%) 
S 
Corp 
(%) 
Partnership 
(Gen Part + LTD part) 
(%) 
Total 
Firms 1635 1556 440 1039 206 4917 
Owner EQ 1308 
(.80) 
1211 
(.78) 
331 
(.75) 
851 
(.82) 
181 
(.88) 
3,733 
Insider EQ 40 
(.024) 
30 
(.019) 
15 
(.034) 
24 
(.023) 
13 
(.063) 
122 
Owner Debt 614 
(.376) 
379 
(.244) 
 
40 
(.091) 
209 
(.201) 
23 
(.112) 
1,256 
Insider Debt 291 
(.178) 
456 
(.293) 
112 
(.255) 
203 
(.195) 
22 
(.107) 
1084 
Business 
Bank Loan 
107 
(.065) 
231 
(.148) 
31 
(.070) 
69 
(.066) 
9 
(.043) 
447 
Personal Bank Loan by 
owners 
93 
(.057) 
91 
(.058) 
28 
(.064) 
87 
(.084) 
15 
(.073) 
314 
Gov Business loan 51 
(.032) 
48 
(.031) 
5 
(.011) 
26 
(.025) 
14 
(.068) 
144 
Gov Loans 229 
(.14) 
140 
(.089) 
72 
(.164) 
97 
(.094) 
28 
(.136) 
566 
Venture capital  41 
(.025) 
37 
(.024) 
25 
(.057) 
34 
(.033) 
6 
(.029) 
143 
 20 
 
Table 5 shows the correlation between the study variables as well as the means and 
standard deviation. The correlation is positive between all the variables except for the correlation 
between chair/CEO separation and ownership loan as a percentage of the total loan.    
 
Table 5: Pairwise correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Eq 2 
(.001) 
19 
(.012) 
9 
(.02) 
15 
(.014) 
5 
(.024) 
50 
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlation between the study variables including; Sole Proprietorship, board 
independence, chair/CEO separation, Venture capital percentage of total equity, bank loan and line of credit, 
owner insider loan, ROE, ROA, employment growth, sales growth, and industry.  
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
PROPREITORSHIP  
0.30**  
0.16**     0.24**  
0.19**     0.15**    0.28**  
0.14**   0.22**    0.17**    0.12**   
0.25**     0.18**     0.09**    0.16**    0.15** 
0.22**     0.15***     -0.13**    0.19**    0.02**    0.23** 
0.31**     0.13**     0.07**    0.18***    0.32**    0.03**    0.14** 
0.09**    0.05**     0.19**     0.16**     0.06**    0.11**    0.12**    0.10** 
0.07***    0.13**    0.25**     0.05**     0.20**     0.08***    0.11**    0.10**    0.9***     
0.12**    0.14**    0.22**     0.04**     0.09***     0.13**    0.11**    0.18**    0.07**    0.12** 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
CHAIR/CEO SEPARATION 
 
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL EQ 
 
GOV LOANS % OF TOTAL EQ 
 
BANK LOAN+LINE OR CREDIT % OF 
TOTAL LOAN 
 
OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF TOTAL 
LOAN 
 
ROE 
ROA 
Sales Growth 
Employment Growth 
Industry 
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7.3. Governance system and ROE 
 
Table 6 shows how the governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured 
by ROE. The governance measures are as reported above.  Specification 3 of the regressions is of 
primary relevance to our study. It shows that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-
sectional variations in the ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables 
presence of one or more independent board member on the board, separation between the person 
holding the CEO position and the person holding the board chair position, greater presence of 
venture capital, and greater use of bank loans. The presence of government loans, however, does 
not affect a start-up’s ROE, perhaps because of poor monitoring activities provided by the 
government. 
 
Table 6: Governance system and Startup performance (ROE) 
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7.4. Governance system and Survival 
 
Table 7 presence in 4 specifications the factors that affect the survival length of start-ups. 
Once again, Specification 3 is the most relevant to this study: it shows that controlling for the size 
and industry, the presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between 
CEO and board chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up's 
longevity.  
Table 6 shows how the governance system affects a start-up's performance as measured by ROE. The 
governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of 
Total Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or 
Credit Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 
3 of the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations 
in the ROE of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. 
 
 SPEC 1 SPEC 2 SPEC 3 
PROP=1 
OTHER ORG=0 
.032  
(0.403) 
.099 
(.112) 
 
SIZE (LOG OF ASSET) .097  
(0.140) 
.223*** 
(.009) 
.093 
(.156) 
INDUSTRY* .077*  
(0.093) 
.043*** 
(.002) 
.073* 
(.099) 
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
.072** 
(.010) 
 .076*** 
(.001) 
CHAIR/CEO 
SEPARATION 
.742***  
(0.001) 
 .744*** 
(.001) 
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL 
EQUITY 
.072*** 
(.001) 
 .70** 
(.021) 
GOV LOANS % 
TOTAL EQUITY 
.542  
(0.193)  
 .556 
(.203) 
BANK LOAN + LINE 
OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN 
.069*** 
(.002) 
 .066** 
(.019) 
OWNER + INSIDER LOAN % OF 
TOTAL LOAN 
.009*** 
(.001) 
 .088*** 
(.001) 
CONSTANT -.302  
(0.182) 
 -.218 
(.102) 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES 
R2 .896 .293 .667 
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The results show that governance variables significantly explain startup survival. Board 
independency, CEO/chair separation positively significantly impact survival, while the form of 
organization (Sole proprietorship) does not affect survival. In addition, Government Loans turns 
to have no significant effect on survival, where all other finance sources explain survival 
significantly. The R square is the highest for the fourth specification explaining 86% of the startup 
survival. 
 
Table 7: Governance System and Survival of Start-ups 
Table 6 presents in 4 specifications the factors that affect the survival length of start-ups. This table presents 
LOGIT results, where a surviving firm takes on a value of 1, the firm that failed takes on a value of 0. 
Specification 3 shows that controlling for the size and industry, the presence of one or more independent 
board member(s), the separation between CEO and board chair, and external funding are effective factors that 
promote a start-up's longevity.   
 
 SPEC 1 SPEC 2 SPEC 3 SPEC 4 
SIZE .821** 
(.039) 
.899* 
(.082) 
.982* 
(.089) 
1.012 
(.169) 
INDUSTRY .799*** 
(.008) 
.891*** 
(.001) 
.782* 
(.088) 
.882*** 
(.000) 
PROP=1 / OTHER ORG=0  .611 
(.124) 
 .620 
(.219) 
BOARD INDEP   .822** 
(.051) 
.810 
(.201) 
CEO/CHAIR SEPA   .989*** 
(.000) 
.980*** 
(.000) 
BANK FIN+LINE OF CREDIT AS % OF TOTAL DEBT   .993*** 
(.001) 
.971*** 
(.000) 
OWNER+INSIDER DEBT AS A % TOTAL DEBT   - .972*** 
(.004) 
- .917*** 
(.001) 
GOVT EQ AS A % TOTAL EQUITY   .819* 
(.094) 
.872 
(.134) 
VENTURE CAP AS A % OF TOTAL EQUITY   .773** 
(.017) 
.730*** 
(.009) 
Constant .891** 
(.013) 
.988** 
(.009) 
.812 
(.132) 
.891 
(.182) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R2 .301 .320 .599 .856 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
7.5. Robustness Check  
 
To conduct our robustness checks, we first run a logistic regression with three 
specifications that examine how a firm's governance system affects a start-up firm's performance. 
We measure firm performance through Return on Assets. Our governance measures include 
Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total Equity, 
Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit 
Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 
3 of the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional 
variations in the ROA of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. These 
results are reflect in Table 8. 
 
We then examine the effect of a firm’s governance system on its performance through 
sales growth. We use the same governance measures as in Table 8. We find that Specification 3 of 
the regressions shows that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations 
in the Sales growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. These results 
are reflected in Table 9. Similarly, we examine the effect of a firm’s governance system on 
performance through employment growth., incorporating the same governance measures as in 
the models used in Table 8 and 9. We find that Specification 3 of the regressions shows that 
controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the Employment 
Growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables. 
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Table 8: Governance system and ROA 
Table 8 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by ROA. The governance 
measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total Equity, 
Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit Percentage 
of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of the regressions show 
that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the ROA of the start-up firms 
can be explained by governance variables. 
 SPEC 1 SPEC 2 SPEC 3 
PROP=1 
OTHER ORG=0 
.039  
(0.554) 
.099 
(.112) 
 
SIZE (LOG OF ASET) .021*  
(0.073) 
.034*** 
(.001) 
.084** 
(.016) 
INDUSTRY* .124*  
(0.081) 
.056*** 
(.003) 
.082* 
(.083) 
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
.044** 
(.023) 
 .033** 
(.011) 
CHAIR/CEO 
SEPARATION 
.922***  
(0.003) 
 .821*** 
(.002) 
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL 
EQ 
.055*** 
(.002) 
 .922** 
(.031) 
GOV LOANS % 
TOTAL EQ 
.669  
(0.211)  
 .734 
(.982) 
BANK LOAN+LINE 
OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN 
.043*** 
(.001) 
 .034** 
(.023) 
OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF 
TOTAL LOAN 
.010*** 
(.001) 
 .064*** 
(.001) 
Constant -.244  
(.208) 
 -.332 
(.434) 
Year Fixed effects YES YES YES 
R2 .772 .332 .506 
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Table 9: Governance system and Sales growth 
Table 9 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by Sales Growth. The 
governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage of Total 
Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or Credit 
Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of the 
regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the Sales 
growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.  
 SPEC 1 SPEC 2 SPEC 3 
PROP=1 
OTHER ORG=0 
.043  
(0.778) 
.099 
(.882) 
 
SIZE (LOG OF ASET) .189*  
(0.092) 
.023*** 
(.001) 
.022 
(.211) 
INDUSTRY* .065  
(0.198) 
.721* 
(.224) 
.372* 
(.019) 
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
.022** 
(.008) 
 .009*** 
(.000) 
CHAIR/CEO 
SEPARATION 
.032**  
(0.019) 
 .033*** 
(.001) 
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL 
EQ 
.065*** 
(.003) 
 .922** 
(.122) 
GOV LOANS % 
TOTAL EQ 
.597  
(0.227)  
 .342 
(.129) 
BANK LOAN+LINE 
OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN 
.032*** 
(.004) 
 .021** 
(.009) 
OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF 
TOTAL LOAN 
.001*** 
(.000) 
 .043*** 
(.001) 
Constant -.665  
(0.360) 
 -.697 
(.301) 
Year Fixed effects YES YES YES 
R2 .667 .109 .439 
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Table 10: Governance system and Employment Growth 
Table 10 shows how governance system affects a start-up’s performance as measured by Employment 
Growth. The governance measures are Board Independence, Chair/CEO Separation, Venture Cap Percentage 
of Total Equity, Government Loans Percentage of Total Equity, the Sum of Bank Loan and Credit Line or 
Credit Percentage of Total Loan, and Owner and Insider Loans Percentage of Total Loan. Specification 3 of 
the regressions show that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional variations in the 
Employment Growth of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables.  
 SPEC 1 SPEC 2 SPEC 3 
PROP=1 
OTHER ORG=0 
.192  
(0.451) 
.099 
(.112) 
 
SIZE (LOG OF ASET) .102*  
(0.102) 
.035*** 
(.003) 
.228 
(.430) 
INDUSTRY* .093  
(0.012) 
.029*** 
(.002) 
.092* 
(.089) 
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE 
.072** 
(.010) 
 .055*** 
(.003) 
CHAIR/CEO 
SEPARATION 
.912***  
(0.001) 
 .810*** 
(.001) 
VENTURE CAP % OF TOTAL 
EQ 
.105** 
(.011) 
 .921** 
(.012) 
GOV LOANS % 
TOTAL EQ 
.744  
(0.231)  
 .754 
(.423) 
BANK LOAN+LINE 
OR CREDIT % OF TOTAL LOAN 
.009*** 
(.000) 
 .043*** 
(.009) 
OWNER+INSIDER LOAN % OF 
TOTAL LOAN 
.291 
(.599) 
 .088*** 
(.001) 
Constant -.104  
(0.223) 
 -.145 
(.334) 
Year Fixed effects YES YES YES 
R2 .791 .330 .439 
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8. Discussion  
The goal of this paper was to investigate the influence of governance mechanisms on 
entrepreneurial firm performance when such firms face different financial uncertainty and 
instability. To achieve this, we used a longitudinal collected data for nearly 5000 firm during their 
first 8 years of existence starting from 2004. Our research shows that the type of ownership (sole 
Properietorship, partnership, etc.) is not significantly related to the firm performance, while 
independent board and duality did show a significant positive effect on start-up performance. 
On the other side, different sources of finance (Venture capital, bank loan, owner loan) did show 
a direct positive significant relationship with start-up performance. This result support the 
reasoning that venture capitalists would bring a unique set of resources to the firm, which in turn 
impact its performance positively (Bruton, Fried & Hisrich, 1997). 
Surprisingly, our results show insignificant effect for government loans (SBA) on the firm 
performance. An explanation of our results can be found as a small portion of the firms in our 
sample use SBA loans. Firms in the sample are also are primarily in high-tech industries and in 
turn may look to venture capital and other forms of financing that support high-growth firms. In 
addition, lending institutions may not be able to properly assess the risk of loans for start-ups, 
which creates issues with information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). This may inhibit 
high-tech start-ups from obtaining loans and thus look for alternatives for raising capital. Lastly, 
SBA loans comprise a small fraction of the loans that are issued to small businesses in the U.S. 
(Brown and Earle, 2015). 
Regarding the impact of governance mechanisms on survival, our results show a direct positive 
impact of duality and independent board members on the startup survival. Our results support 
(Scholes, et al., (2013), Daily and Dalton (1992), Daily and Dalton (1993)) that board independency 
reduces failure rate in startup firms. Outside directors can provide monitoring knowledge and 
experience that contributes to survival (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). This result is opposite to (George 
et al., 2005), they attributed the negative impact of outsiders’ board members on survival as risk 
taking behavior may be increased as outside directors have greater sector expertise and work 
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under pressure from outsider investors to enhance the performance, which may reduce the 
likelihood of survival. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and SLDB (2001) offer two opposing theories on the necessity 
and effectiveness of governance system for private firms: Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose 
that a governance system is not only unnecessary but may lead to reduction in the firm’s value, 
while SLDB (2001) suggest that a governance system is not only necessary but augments a private 
firm's value. We contribute to this debate by examining the effect of governance system on the 
survivability and performance of the US start-up firms. In this paper, we present evidence in 
support of SLDB (2001). 
When examining the survival rates of the various forms of organization, which include 
Sole Prop, LLC, C Corporation, S Corporation, and Partnership, with partnerships having the 
highest survival rates. When we examine the effect of firm governance structures on firm 
performance, our results reflect that controlling for the firm size and the industry, cross-sectional 
variations in the performance of the start-up firms can be explained by governance variables; 
presence of one or more independent board member on the board, separation between the person 
holding the CEO position and the chair of the board. When focusing on startup survival, we find 
that the presence of one or more independent board member(s), the separation between CEO and 
board chair, and external funding are effective factors that promote a start-up firm’s longevity. 
Our robustness checks test the effect of firm governance structures on firm performance 
measured by return on assets, sales growth, and employment growth. The results from these 
robustness checks support our hypotheses. We conclude that our results provide evidence that 
firm governance structures impact performance measured by ROE, ROA, sales growth, and 
employment growth. Our findings may be useful for organizations that support start-up 
ventures, such as business incubators and accelerators, start-up lenders, and venture capitalists.  
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The firms included in KFS are skewed towards technology firms. Tracking a wider range 
of start-up firms over a longer period of time will add to the current literature. Also, examining 
the characteristics of the entrepreneur in terms of altruism would be a great direction for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Exploring the Nexus Between Governance, Entrepreneurial Orientation, Performance, and 
Survival: Evidence from U.S. startups 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) describes how a firm's entrepreneurial attributes (i.e., 
innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness) shape its 
performance as well as survival. In recent years, EO has invited a significant amount of empirical 
work, with the main focus being on the effect of entrepreneurial decision making on the 
performance and survival of a private enterprise. The conclusions of this line of research have 
often been conflicting: some researchers find that there is a strong relationship between EO and 
performance, implying that a small business that starts with a strong EO will perform better than 
the one that does not (see, for example, Hult, Snow & Kandemir (2003), while others report lower 
or even no significant correlations between EO and performance (George, 2011). 
The principal reason for the conflicting results might lie in the exclusion of factors that 
potentially moderate the EO-performance relationship, especially external factors such as 
environmental conditions (Barney 1991, Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marin 2005).  More 
recently, a new branch of research has evolved proposing that the EO performance relationship 
is contingent on the degree of governance, specifically, the degree of separation in ownership, 
management, and control (Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Madison et al., 2014; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
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Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes (2012) raise a question about the direct relationship between 
individual EO dimensions and performance in small business enterprises. Top managers and 
directors also tend to have the longer business horizon in decision making, and this may influence 
their pursuit of first-mover advantages through innovation, proactiveness, and risk-taking 
(Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Zahra et al., 2004; Zellweger & Sieger, 2012). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
additionally argue that the dimensions of EO may vary independently, which implies that the 
effect of individual dimensions of EO on firm performance should be emphasized. 
The main focus of this paper is on the building of relationships between governance and 
the individual dimensions of EO, giving systematic explanations for the moderating effects of 
individual dimensions of EO on the governance–performance relationship in transitional 
economies. More specifically, from empirical results about different moderating effects of the 
dimensions of EO on the governance–performance relationship, we offer more fine-tuned 
insights on this issue. Moreover, although existing studies have suggested that entrepreneurial 
movements can help first movers to acquire both temporary and sustained high performance 
(Zahra, 1991, Zahra & Covin, 1995Wiklund, 1999, and Zahra & Covin, 1995), empirical evidence 
on this proposition is still limited. This study fills the void by considering longitudinal data to 
test both the short run and sustaining effects of startup governance on the EO- performance-
survival link. 
Besides incorporating environmental condition (in terms of governance system), this 
paper is an improvement as it eschews some shortcomings inherent in the existing EO research. 
First, researchers differ in their definition of each element of the EO. This paper does not depend 
on the unambiguous definition of EO attributes. Second, EO factors are derived based on 
interpretations of response to questions contained in the Kaufman survey. , The responses are 
subjective and do not lend themselves to quantifiable measures. Governance factors, although 
obtained from the same survey are straightforward, unambiguous, and, easy to measures. Third, 
the information on governance factors can be easily obtained independently of the Kaufman's 
survey. 
A major contribution of this paper, therefore, is to present a link between the EO factors 
and governance factors to identify objective measures that are likely to influence the performance 
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and survival of an entrepreneur. Another potentially significant contribution of the paper is to 
weigh in on the continuing debate of whether a good governance system adds to or detracts from 
the value of a small business. On the one hand, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that a 
governance system is unnecessary (because the conflicts of interest between the owner and the 
manager do not exist)  and as such, it might be value reducing. On the other hand, Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001 (hereafter SLDB) argue private owners' preferences are 
expressed in economic as well as non-economic terms. According to SLDB, a major source of the 
non-economically motivated behavior is altruism which "allows the individual to simultaneously 
satisfy both altruistic (other-regarding) preferences and egotistic (self-regarding) preferences" (p. 
102). SLDB (2001) suggest that a good governance system is needed for private firms as well to 
reign in the non-economic preferences that are likely to have a negative effect a firm's 
performance. 
The paper proceeds along the following lines. Section 2 provides a broad survey of EO 
literature and how EO might affect a firm’s performance as well as its survival.  Section 3 develops 
hypotheses, section 4 for the analysis and results. 
 
2. Literature Survey  
Over the last two decades, an increasing amount of research has integrated the areas of 
EO and private firms (Casillas & Moreno, 2010; Lumpkin et al., 2010; Zahra, 1991). However, 
earlier studies rarely examine how governance is connected to EO in explaining firm 
performance. In this section, a) we review the literature on the relationship between EO and firm 
performance, and survival, b) propose a link between the governance and EO and c) develop 
testable hypotheses. 
 
2.1. Entrepreneurial Orientation  
EO is a strategy-making process that characterizes an organization's entrepreneurship. 
Prior studies use two major approaches in conceptualizing EO: the composite dimension 
approach presented by Covin and Slevin (1989) and the multidimensional approach posited by 
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Lumpkin and Dess (1996). In the composite dimension approach, EO represents a unidimensional 
construct characterized by innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. In the 
multidimensional approach, EO is characterized by innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking, 
proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Specifically, innovation 
keeps firms ahead of their competitors and gains competitive advantages; proactiveness gives 
firms the ability to present new products and services to the market before their competitors 
(Wiklund, 1999); while risky strategies lead to a higher long-term mean performance despite  
some projects failing while others experience short-term success (Wiklund & Shephard, 2005). All 
these innovation efforts lead to improved financial results for firms.   
Miller (1983) argues that an entrepreneurial firm is willing to engage in the innovation of 
products and technological processes, to provide proactive innovations to pursue first-mover 
advantages, and to undertake risky ventures. Most past research on EO follows the composite 
dimension approach, summing across all aspects of EO to create a single variable. But such a 
unidimensional construct does not adequately represent the various factors involved in 
entrepreneurial processes and their varying impact on performance outcomes. We agree with 
Gartner (1985) that the creation of a new business is a multidimensional strategy and we, 
therefore, utilize the multidimensional approach in our examination of EO in this study.  
 
2.2. EO and firm performance  
  Many studies in the field of entrepreneurship focus on understanding the 
relationship between EO and organizational performance because of the belief that firms with 
strong EO perform much better than those that do not adopt an EO (Covin & Slevin, 1986; Hult 
et al., 2003; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). However, assessing the magnitude of this relationship 
has yielded mixed results. Some studies report lower correlations or even no significant 
relationship between EO and performance (Covin, Slevin & Schultz, 1994; Lumpkin & Dess, 
2001). These findings convey the important message that is simply examining the direct 
relationship between EO and performance provides an incomplete picture of this domain.  
A few recent studies have shifted some focus to the indirect relationship between EO and 
performance. Catherine and Wang (2008) propose that learning orientation is one of the missing 
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links in the EO–performance relationship. Li et al. (2009) use survey data to examine the 
mediating role of the knowledge creation process. Other studies focus on the role of exploratory 
capabilities in the relationship of EO and performance (Lisboa, Skarmeas & Lages, 2011). But none 
of these explorations have paid sufficient attention to governance variables, which is an essential 
part of entrepreneurship success. Governance can result in sustainable changes in a firm's 
activities and decision-making process. Effective activities and processes are required to cope 
with such changes and attain superior performance. Based on this reasoning, we propose that 
governance pattern, a key concept that describes the control and monitoring of the startup, may 
be a missing link in the examination of the EO performance relationship.  
Conflict research regarding the impact of each of the EO dimensions on firm performance 
have aroused, according to Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes (2012) Innovative SMEs do perform 
better in turbulent environments, but those innovative SMEs should minimize the level of risk 
and should take action to avoid projects that are too risky. McCann, Leon-Guerrero, & Haley 
(2001) suggest that family firms that invest in entrepreneurship and innovation have more 
significant potential for high performance. They found that The positive influence of EO on 
performance is related to the first-mover advantages and the tendency to take advantages of 
emerging opportunities implied by EO. Specifically, innovation keeps firms ahead of their 
competitors and gains competitive advantages; proactiveness gives firms the ability to present 
new products/services to the market ahead of competitors. According to (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Wiklund, 1999) an entrepreneurial firm is willing to engage in the innovation of products and 
technological processes, to provide proactive innovations to pursue first-mover advantages, and 
to undertake risky ventures. This, in turn, will elevate their performance. 
Autonomy also has been positively proven to impact the firm performance. Employee 
involvement shapes their understanding of top managers' willingness to facilitate and support 
entrepreneurial behavior. When coupled with a voluntary acceptance of work discretion and 
autonomy, the EO of the firm would be expected to be more effective (Hornsby et al., 2002). 
Kemelgor (2002) argue that there is a strong relationship between EO, measured by its network, 
and performance, and that team's intra- and extra-industry networks and autonomy influence 
the performance of new ventures. 
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Evidence regarding risk-taking and firm performance is conflicted, Kraus, Rigtering, and 
Hughes (2012) find that the interaction term of risk-taking was significantly but negatively related 
to SME business performance. Also, proactiveness was directly related to a multidimensional 
measure of business performance (Kraus, Rigtering, and Hughes, 2012; Becherer and Maurer, 
1999). Proactiveness was positively and significantly related to change in sales (growth), while no 
significant relationship was found with change in profits. Becherer and Maurer (1999) suggested 
that ‘‘proactive leaders are growing the firm as a strategic approach to the marketplace". 
Finally, Martin and Lumpkin (2003) suggest that a new entry that is an imitation of an 
existing product or service would be considered entrepreneurial if the move implies an 
aggressive, head-to-head confrontation in the market, as later generations in family firms assume 
control and focus more on value and profitability than on directly challenging competitors to gain 
market share, the level of competitive aggressiveness decreases as well as the ability to maintain 
a market share. 
 
2.3. EO and firm survival  
In an environment of rapid change and shortened product and business model life cycles, 
future profit streams from existing operations are uncertain, requiring businesses to constantly 
seek new opportunities. Therefore, firms may benefit from adopting EO (Rauch et al. 2009). Partly 
in contrast to these claims of the pivotal role of EO for organizational success, Success is often 
defined in broader terms, including nonfinancial performance or the survival of the firm. 
Research on entrepreneurship in firms that have survived and prospered for long periods of time 
is divided as to whether these organizations represent a context where entrepreneurship 
flourishes or is hampered (e.g., Naldi et al. 2007). Entrepreneurship Orientation is seen as critical 
to firm’s success and survival across generations (Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006; Rogoff and 
Heck 2003; Salvato 2004). It refers to entrepreneurial activities within organizations that are 
designed to revitalize the company’s business and to establish sustainable competitive 
advantages that help them survive and live longer (cp. Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006; Kuratko 
et al. 2005; Zahra 1995, 1996). 
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Regarding innovation impact on small firm survival, Younger and smaller family firms 
are more likely to be innovative than older, larger family firms and live longer. Furthermore, 
innovativeness is having greater potential for high performance, if it is driven by comprehensive 
strategic decision-making and long-term orientation (McCann et al. (2001)). Also, Autonomy is 
important regarding long-term entrepreneurial performance and survival, Nordqvist et al. (2008) 
suggest considering autonomy as having both an external (autonomy from stakeholders such as 
banks, suppliers, customers, and financial markets) and an internal (empowering individuals and 
teams within an organization) dimension. Hence, literature seems to propose that, while 
autonomy may be seen as an important factor of corporate entrepreneurship, both internal and 
external autonomy need to be considered for long-lived firms.  
As outlined in the definition of EO, regarding the risk-taking impact on firm success and 
survival, ambiguous findings of levels of risk-taking in firms may be related to the inconsistent 
use of definitions and measures (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Morck and Yeung 2003). Martin and 
Lumpkin (2003) investigate risk regarding investing personal assets and making loans to the 
business, tolerance of debt, and the importance of increasing profitability. Other authors 
investigate willingness to innovate (Benson 1991), the variation of performance outcomes 
(Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007), or debt levels (leverage) as a measure of control risk (Mishra and 
McConaughy 1999). Drawing on this confusion, Zahra (2005) claims that a broader definition of 
risk-taking is needed, as it is a complex construct with presumably multiple dimensions. 
Across different studies, all firms should be very ‘‘cautious with debt capital’’ to avoid the 
risk of losing control over the company (control risk), the more they financed investments with 
their cash flow, the better was their survival probabilities (Mishra and McConaughy 1999). We 
rely on the assumption that lower levels of EO, specifically the more of risk-taking dimension, 
should endanger organizational survival and prosperity (e.g., Covin et al. 2006; Dess et al. 2003; 
Wiklund 2006; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005).  
Inconsistent findings exist in the literature regarding the relevance of proactiveness in the 
context of family firms. Nordqvist et al. (2008) argue that family firms are more inclined to be 
proactive. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) view proactiveness as the organizational pursuit 
of favorable business opportunities and can lead to first-mover advantages and higher economic 
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profits, and long life of the firm.  In contrast, Martin and Lumpkin (2003) find that proactiveness 
does not seem to be a consistent predictor of family firm success (growth and survival), and they 
were not able to prove that proactiveness decreases with later generations in family firms. 
Zellweger and Sieger (2010) research the proactiveness in family firms suggesting that the firm 
dynamic pattern regarding the level of proactiveness over time heavily affect their life, they show 
that long-lived firms have longer periods of rather low levels of proactiveness, interrupted by 
phases of carefully selected proactive moves. 
Competitiveness is also seen to be a positive factor affecting firm survival, as a new entry 
that imitates an existing product or service would be considered entrepreneurial if the move 
implies an aggressive, head-to-head confrontation in the market, as later generations in family 
firms assume control and focus more on value and profitability than on directly challenging 
competitors to gain market share, the level of competitive aggressiveness decreases as well as the 
ability to maintain a market share (Martin and Lumpkin, 2003). 
 
3. Hypotheses Development: Linking Governance and EO 
3.1. Innovativeness 
Innovativeness refers to a "firm's tendency to engage in and support new ideas, novelty, 
experimentation, and creative processes that may result in new products, services, or 
technological processes" (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The extant literature presents numerous 
ways to classify innovation, including continuous versus discontinuous, incremental versus 
radical, and technical versus administrative. But perhaps the most general classification is 
technological innovation versus product-market innovation. 
The agency costs approach predicts that diffuse equity ownership negatively affects 
corporate innovation activity because it enables the managers to pursue their objectives, such as 
increasing their wealth and prestige, to the detriment of projects that increase profits. Indeed, 
since the costs of monitoring exceed the benefits, small dispersed shareholders do not have 
incentives to monitor management behavior (Berle and Means, 1932; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, Cho (1998) cautions researchers that 
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corporate ownership and innovation activity may be linked in a two-way relationship. Cho (1998) 
performs a simultaneous regression using data on 230 Fortune 500 manufacturing firms (for the 
year 1991) and shows that, whereas ownership structure affects R&D spending, the R&D 
spending affects the corporate value and, in turn, ownership structure. This may cast doubt on 
the empirical results obtained by assuming that the ownership structure is exogenously 
determined. 
Based on agency theory, corporate governance research assumes that various ownership 
constituencies have homogeneous preferences for corporate strategies such as new product 
innovation. Research has shown that firm leverage has a negative relationship with investments 
in R&D (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Alternatively, equity holders 
have a residual claimant status and therefore generally have a stronger interest in projects using 
firm-specific resources (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). Separate ownership constituencies have some 
different preferences in governance. These results suggest that ownership constituencies may not 
be directly substitutable as monitors of the firms, especially firms emphasizing corporate 
innovation strategies. Thus, agency theory should be amended to suggest that not all owners are 
alike in relationship to governance approaches and innovation strategies.  Concentrated 
ownership is found to be positively affecting innovation for many reasons; it reduces agency costs 
and disciplines managers' behavior  (Hill and Snell (1988), Holmstrom (1989), Baysinger et al. 
(1991), Francis and Smith (1995)),  favors financial commitments and organizational integration 
(Lacetera, 2001), makes reputation constraints tighter and favors long-term relations (Mayer 
(1997), Miozzo and Dewick (2002)), exacerbates asymmetric bargaining power problems 
(Battaggion and Tajoli (2001)), favors managers' flexibility and specialization (Ortega-Argile ś et 
al., 2005), and according to nonlinear relationship depending on country characteristics (Lee, 
2005). 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue that boards dominated by outside directors may 
lead firms to reduce investment in the development of internal innovation and focus more on 
product diversification and external innovation through acquisitions. Outside directors, given 
their time and information processing constraints, are likely to use financial rather than the 
strategic evaluation of managers. Hoskisson et al., (2001) suggest that when inside directors are 
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dominant, firms focus on internal innovation in firms that report R&D expenditures. Findings 
suggest that inside directors prefer internal innovation (Zahra, 1996) and (Li and Simerly, 1998), 
thus, outside directors likely perceive less risk associated with external innovation than internal 
innovation, at least partly, because of the asymmetric information between outside and inside 
directors. Equity finance positively affects innovation because it helps risk management and 
financial commitments, and reduces asymmetric information problems (Bradley et al. (1984), 
Long and Malitz (1985), Williamson (1988), Gugler (2001), Carpenter and Petersen (2002), 
Lazonick (2007)). Therefore, we hypothesize:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial innovativeness.  
3.2. Autonomy 
Autonomy refers to "the independent action of an individual or team in bringing forth an 
idea or vision and carrying it through to completion" (Lumpkin et al.,1996). In an organizational 
context, autonomy refers to organizational members acting and making decisions independently. 
Autonomy may vary with firm size. Past studies have examined the extent of autonomous 
behavior in small firms by investigating the level of centralization. For example, (Dill, 1958) 
higher autonomy was associated with less complex task assignments, lower risk, more control 
over information flows, and more formalized interaction. Miller (1983) finds that high levels of 
entrepreneurial activities are associated with the most autonomous leaders who have strong 
central authority in small firms. White (1986) found that certain strategies that require high levels 
of control produce better results with low rather than with high autonomy. Shrivastava and Grant 
(1985) find that this high level of entrepreneurial activities also has a strong reliance on 
managerial autocracy. Some studies indicate that firms with autonomous leaders can overcome 
organizational resistance promptly, for example, by submitting market ideas directly to top 
management and communicating with all parties effectively. Therefore, we can infer that 
autonomy facilitates innovation speed through centralization in small firms. 
 
In traditional small business literature, the concept of small firms’ governance includes 
ownership, management, and control (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Prior studies have found that 
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the advantages of private firms in mitigating agency problems are more likely to be realized when 
ownership is combined with active management and control; in contrast, under passive 
governance, such potential advantages are less likely to be realized (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chu, 
2011). Following this notion, this study examines whether EO indeed magnifies the positive 
association between governance and firm performance. Autonomy as captured in the EO 
construct refers to the ‘‘independent action of an individual or a team in bringing forth an idea 
or a vision and carrying it through to completion’’ (Lumpkin and Dess 1996, p. 140), that is, the 
ability and will to be self-directed in the pursuit of opportunities. In governance context, it may 
lead to the separation of the CEO and the chair of a board (duality), where the CEO cannot remain 
free to act independently, to make key decisions. 
Active governance in single firms would be presented in the firm's CEO plays dual roles 
as the Chair of the board. Duality is a common phenomenon for single-family firms. According 
to (Daily and Dalton, 1992), maintaining control is essential, in most cases, the founder-manager 
would serve as both CEO and board chairperson. Otherwise, there exists some risk of divided 
authority. On the other hand, the multifamily firm will likely avoid duality as it can cause the 
concentration of power to one person who might use it in the opposite of the interests of others, 
especially in the absence of an independent board. Thus active governance in multifamily firms 
exhibits a lower incidence of duality than single-family firms and therefore lower autonomy. 
Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial autonomy 
 
3.3. Risk-taking  
Miller and Friesen (1982) define risk-taking as “the degree to which managers are willing 
to make large and risky resource commitments, that is, those which have a reasonable chance of 
costly failures.” There are two implications in this definition, both of which are necessary for 
understanding how risk-taking is influenced by governance. First, firms with an EO tend to 
engage in risk-taking behavior, such as incurring heavy debt or making large resource 
commitments. Second, such investments demonstrate that top management has an intense 
commitment to achievement and prospects for the positive outcome. 
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There are more arguments in the literature that could justify a positive association 
between governance and corporate risk-taking. First, in poor governance firms, management may 
obtain nontrivial cash flows and enjoy substantial private benefits from the firms that they control 
(e.g., Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005), Stulz (2005)). Their high exposure may lead them to 
be conservative in directing corporate investment and thus less risk-taking. Second, non-equity 
stakeholders such as banks, governments, and organized labor, which often prefer conservative 
corporate investment, may influence investment policy for their benefit. Their influence is higher 
in low highly corporate governance environments (e.g., Morck and Nakamura (1999), Tirole 
(2001), Roe (2003)). 
On the other hand, the literature also offers justification for a negative association between 
governance and risk-taking. First, when governance improves there is less fear of expropriation 
by managers and consequently less need for concentrated ownership (Burkart, Panunzi, and 
Shleifer (2003)). (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). The ownership concentration may result in 
management implementing conservative investment policies. This may result in a negative 
relation between governance and risk-taking. Second, in weaker investor protection locations 
firms have dominant owners who may control a pyramid of firms (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung 
(2005), Stulz (2005)). The dominant owner may instruct lower-layer units to take excess risks and 
tunnel gains to upper-layer units leaving lower-level units to absorb any potential losses. Thus, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
 
3.4. Proactiveness  
Although proactiveness is a characteristic of firms that are the first to introduce new 
products or services, some researchers have found that the second firm to enter a new market can 
be just as pioneering as the first entrant and just as likely to achieve success via proactiveness 
(Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman,1978). Therefore, proactiveness refers to firms that have the will 
to be a leader and the foresight to seize new opportunities, even if they are not always the first to 
enter the market. In an entrepreneurial context, proactiveness refers to the way firms relate to 
market opportunities in the process of new entry.  
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There is a broad debate about whether governance protection afforded to managers is 
beneficial to the firm (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005) under the viewpoint that protected managers 
tend to be sheltered from the market fluctuations, which leads to inferior firm performance 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). Also, the vast majority of studies find that corporate 
governance factors might affect the entry mode decision. Both internalization theory (McManus, 
1972; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) and the resource-based view 
(Teece et al., 1997; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Dierickx and Cool, 1989) see proactiveness as the 
primary means for firms to appropriate rents in overseas markets from the exploitation of their 
idiosyncratic resources and capabilities. Therefore, we can hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: Governance factors capture entrepreneurial proactiveness.  
 
3.5. Competitive aggressiveness  
Competitive aggressiveness is characterized by responsiveness, which involves adapting 
to competitors' challenges. Competitively aggressive firms often respond to such challenges with 
head-to-head confrontation. Competitive aggressiveness may also reflect a willingness to 
compete using unconventional methods, such as analyzing and targeting competitors' 
weaknesses (Stuart & Abetti, 1987) and adopting unconventional tactics to challenge industry’s 
leaders (Cooper, Willard & Woo, 1986).  
Managers may prefer growth to profits (empire building may bring prestige or higher 
salaries), may be lazy or fraudulent ("shirk"), and may maintain costly labor or product standards 
above the necessary competitive minimum, thereby reducing individual incentives to exercise 
rights and creating the preference for exit (Eisenhardt, 1989). Similarly, interfirm ownership may 
create networks that condition business competition, cooperation, and innovation (Whitley, 
1999). 
Competition may both influence and be influenced by governance systems, the 
effectiveness of various types of governance systems may be impacted by the degree of product 
market competition and the extension of competition (Mayer, 1997). He also suggests that Firms 
that receive a larger fraction of their debt financing from one lender invest, sell more and are more 
competitive, in addition, The structure of boards (role of non-executives, separate chairs and chief 
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executives, and remuneration, audit, and nominating committees.) affect the way in which 
companies are managed and controlled and their completive behavior. There exists a positive 
relationship between ownership structure and competitiveness; Small private firms tend to have 
better competitiveness than public firms (Zhang et al., 2000). Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Governance factors capture entrepreneurial, competitive aggressiveness 
 
Figure 2 depicts the linkage between governance factors and EO factors. It represents the 
conceptual model of moderating entrepreneurial orientation in the relationship between the 
governance structure and firm performance and survival. The direct relationship between 
governance and the five EO factors represents the five-main hypothesis in the study. The second 
set of direct relationships is between the five EO factors and performance and survival. While the 
main indirect relationship is between Governance and performance/survival through the impact 
of EO factors. 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual framework for the direct and indirect relationship between EO and firm performance and survival through 
governance 
As shown in figure 2, we build some expectations on the relationship between governance 
variables and each of the EO factors as shown in table 1. Table 1 summarizes the expected 
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relations between the governance variables and the EO dimensions with an explanation for the 
sign relationship between each of them.  
 
Table 11: Diagram of Governance-EO-linkage 
Table 1 shows the linkage between the governance variables; leverage, duality, outside director and 
ownership, and the EO factors; innovativeness, autonomy, risk taking, proactiveness, competitiveness.   
GOV 
PROXIES 
SIGN EO 
ATTRIBUTES 
COMMENTS 
LEVERAGE 
 
- Innovativeness Debt finance negatively affects innovation because it puts constraints on the firm’s 
ability to take on risky innovation; 
- Autonomy Debt finance negatively affect autonomy as it reduces managers autonomy in making 
decisions 
- Risk Taking Debt financing decreases a firm’s  risk-taking ability 
- Proactiveness Higher debt financing might restrict the firm’s ability to lead the market and be 
proactive 
+ Competitiveness  Firms that receive a larger proportion of their debt financing from one lender invest, 
sell more, and are more competitive. 
DUALITY 
 
- Innovativeness When positions of the CEO and chairman are held by the same person, the directors 
are less likely to be independent and therefore might be less effective in 
innovativeness. However, it may limit the benefits from hiring the best existing 
professional managers that can have particularly large for innovative activities. 
+ Autonomy When the same person holds both board chair and CEO positions he/she can exercise 
more autonomy;  
-/+ Risk Taking A board dominated by dual  CEO and chair will be  more effective in controlling 
opportunistic managerial risk-taking behavior. 
In some cases, duality can lead to more risk-taking. 
- Proactiveness Duality tends to cause avoidance of proactiveness due to more monitoring of activities 
and risk avoidance. 
+ Competitiveness  As competitiveness requires faster decisions, Dual leadership allows firms to make 
speedier decisions and react more quickly to new information than separate 
leadership.   
OUTSIDE 
DIRECTOR 
 
+ Innovativeness Independent board positively affects innovation because it reduces agency costs and 
disciplines managers’ behavior   
- Autonomy Independent board reduces manager control and thus lowers autonomy 
      -/+ Risk Taking Independent directors allow managers greater discretion to reduce risk-taking. 
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N/A Proactiveness Independent directors have a neutral impact on proactiveness 
+ Competitiveness  Independent board affect the way in which companies are managed and controlled 
and thus their completive behavior 
OWNERSHIP 
(number of 
owners) 
 
+ Innovativeness Higher # of owners might promote innovation. 
+ Autonomy Higher number is likely to have less autonomy  
+/- Risk Taking Higher number may support higher risk- 
+ Proactiveness higher number might slow down proactiveness 
+ Competitiveness  Higher number might increase competitive ability 
4. Sample, Variables, and Data 
4.1. Sample 
We utilize Kauffman Survey Data (KFS) which tracks a sample of firms from their 
inceptions through their first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from 
2004 until 2011. The data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy, 
innovation, organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owner-
operators are defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the 
day-to-day operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating 
assistance" (Farhat and Robb, 2014).  
 
The sampling frame for the KFS is based on the Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) database and 
restricted to businesses (or enterprises) that are reported by D&B as starting in 2004. This database 
is a compilation of data from various sources, including credit bureaus, state oﬃces that register 
some new businesses, and companies (e.g., credit card and shipping companies) that are likely to 
be used by all businesses. Importantly, this is not the same database as the D&B business registry 
available on the Internet; the sample from which our data are drawn contains vastly greater 
coverage of ﬁrms in the United States. The KFS data includes an oversample of high-tech ﬁrms; 
thus, all of our analyses use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the 
frame from which the sample was drawn. 
4.2. Variables 
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4.2.1. Dependent variables 
4.2.1.1. Performance  
Because these companies are privately-held, market performance measures are not 
available. Therefore, we rely on the accounting measures of performance discussed below: 
• ROA: Net income/average total assets, using the average assets based on the 
average of beginning and end of year assets; 
• ROE: Net income/average equity, where average equity is based on the average of 
beginning and end of year equity.  
• Employment growth: measured by the increase in the employment percentage 
over the life of the firm. 
• Sales Growth: measured by the growth in the firm sales over the years. 
4.2.1.2. Survival 
Measured by the binary variable of survival as of 0 and 1 of the firm through the eight years of 
the survey. 
4.2.2. Independent variables: Governance structure 
We included the main governance factors in the private firms; ownership structure (single 
vs. Multiple), Duality, Independent Directors and Leverage. Where: 
• Ownership structure is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm is 
owned by a single owner (i.e., proprietor) and zero if the firm is owned by multiple 
owners ; 
• Board structure is proxied by the presence of one or more independent directors on 
the board. Outsiders on the board of directors is any director who is unrelated to the 
family. We use a dummy variable to capture the essence of this variable: it takes a 
value of 1 if the board has an independent director, zero otherwise.  
• For sources of financing, we employ several proxies : 
 55 
o Ratio of debt to equity= Measured using the median leverage of all firms and 
ranking firms as above and below the median. 
o Financing via owners 
o Financing via a bank loan 
o Financing via government finance; and  
o Financing via venture capital 
   
4.2.3. Moderating variables: Entrepreneurial Orientation  
EO has five dimensions; innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking, competitive 
aggressiveness, and autonomy. Multiple questions developed in Kauffman Survey are used to 
measure each of these EO elements. Two question phrases are exploited. The respondents are 
asked to report their EO in a follow-up of eight years (2004-2011) by giving a dummy answer of 
1 or 0, where the one presents the strength of the EO in the firm. 
4.2.4. Control variables:  
To control for the effects of variables that may have an important influence on both 
performance and survival, we include three control variables: firm age, firm size, and industry. 
Resources vary significantly depending on the size of the firm. Resource-based theory affirms 
that firm resources are the most valuable source of their competitive advantage and excellence 
(Barney, 1991). For small enterprises, the respective economies of scale are constrained by the 
limited resources, putting them at a disadvantage where growth is concerned (Aragón-Sánchez 
and Sánchez-Marin 2005).  
4.2.5. Variable definition and computation:  
On Table 2, we show the definition of the five EO factors and the questions used to 
measure them. For each variable, we used two to three questions from the KFS survey that was 
mostly related to the factor definition (Appendix 1).   
Table 12: Variable definition and measurement 
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Table 2 shows the definition used for each of the EO variables including innovation, autonomy, risk-
taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness. 
 
Variable Definition 
Innovativeness The firm's likelihood to promote and support original ideas, experimentation, 
and creative processes that may lead to new products, services, or technological 
processes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). We measure it by three questions in the 
survey. 
Autonomy An individual or team's independent action in bringing an idea or vision and 
implementing it through to completion (Lumpkin et al.,1996). In an 
organizational context, autonomy refers to organizational members acting and 
making decisions independently. We measure it by three questions in the 
survey. 
Risk-taking The degree that managers are willing to make substantial and risky resource 
commitments, which have a reasonable chance of costly failures. We measure it 
as the total external debt to the total external equity. 
Proactiveness The willingness of the firm to be a leader and the foresight to seize new 
opportunities, even if they are not always the first to enter the market. In an 
entrepreneurial context, proactiveness refers to the way firms relate to market 
opportunities in the process of new entry.  
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
The willingness to compete using unconventional methods, such as analyzing 
and targeting competitors' weaknesses (Stuart & Abetti, 1987) and adopting 
unconventional tactics to challenge industry’s leaders (Cooper, Willard & Woo, 
1986).  
 
 
4.3. Data Sources  
We use Kauffman Survey Data which tracks a sample of firms from their start through their 
first eight years of existence. This survey is conducted each year from 2004 until 2011. The 
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data includes information on business characteristics, firm strategy, innovation, 
organizational structure, and active-owner-operator demographics. Active-owner-operators 
are defined as a firm owner who, "provides regular assistance or advice regarding the day-
to-day operations of the business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating 
assistance" (Farhat and Robb, 2014). Several studies have used KFS data to further understand 
new firm characteristics, such as analyzing the financing of new firms (Coleman and Robb, 
2009; 2011; Cole and Sokolyk, 2013), comparisons of different types of new firms (Welsh, 
Desplaces, and Davis, 2011), and firm survival (Robb and Reynolds, 2009). 
  
The KFS is based on a random sample of businesses--from the Dun and Bradstreet (DB) 
database, which was created in 2004. The design for the questionnaires for the sample was 
done by Mathematica Policy Research. The baseline questionnaire was delivered in 2004, and 
follow-up questionnaires were sent every following year. So far adding to the baseline are 
three following waves consisting of 2005, 2006 and 2007 data. The development and change 
aspects involved with innovations in high-tech industries motivated the Foundation to 
oversample firms in these fields. The screening/eligibility test allowed only 15 percent of the 
potential pool of firms to be part of the sample. The initial sample of firms passed "the 
eligibility test" defining a new business in 2004 and consisted of 4,928 firms out of an initial 
pool of 32,429 businesses. Respondents were paid $50 to answer using a self- administered 
web survey or a computer-assisted telephone interview. 
  
Eligibility for inclusion in the data was determined by two tests. The firm must be a new 
company and must be a company created individually by de novo entrepreneurs. The first 
test confirms that the company had started its activity in 2004. Thus, if the firm had started 
activity before 2004, the firm was not included in the sample. The second test confirmed the 
ownership and provenance of the firm. The firm cannot be a subsidiary of any other business 
and cannot be a spin-off, nor be inherited by previous owners. Finally, the firm cannot be a 
not-for-profit company. Firms that passed both tests were included in the sample in the 
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baseline questionnaire and corresponding follow-ups. The baseline questionnaire records 
data at the birth of the firm, and thus is used as the main operational conditions in the study. 
  
There are four waves available in the current Kauffman Firm Survey. Firms that are included 
in the first wave satisfied two conditions. They first needed to be part of the sample and 
survive the first year of activity. The first wave found that 7.4 percent (6 percent plus 1.4 
percent) of the 4,928 (369) were out of business by the end of 2005. There were 4,523 businesses 
left in 2005. More businesses were found have closed by the time of the second and third 
follow-ups. Some of the surviving firms chose not to answer, and sample weights were 
adjusted accordingly. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
The following table (3) presents the summary statistics for the data based on the forms of 
organization (Panel A), Industry Classification (Panel B), and survival rate (Panel C) as of 
2011. On panel A, the sample is classified based on the form of organization, showing that 
partnership has the highest percentage of duality – the separation between CEO and the board 
chair- while sole Proprietorship has the lowest percentage of 7%. Regarding the independent 
board, partnership again shows the highest percentage of having independent members on 
their board of directors, while sole Proprietorship has the lowest percentage of 18%.  Limited 
liability corporations show the lowest percentage of using debt compared to equity in their 
financing options. While partnership has the highest ratio of 63%. 
 
On Panel (B), we classify the sample based on the industry as high tech, medium tech, and 
low tech. The results show that low tech industry has highest duality percentage. While the 
high tech firms have the highest independent board percentage as well as using of leverage. 
On panel (C), the sample is classified based on survival, showing that firms who survived as 
of 2011 have the highest percentages of using duality and independent members on the board. 
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While those who did not survive seems to have more usage of debt in their capital structure. 
Panel D shows the classification based on form size as total assets where the first group with 
a size of less than $10,000 represents 40% of the sample, 39% for the second size group 
between $10,000 and $100,000. And 21% of the last group with total assets more than $100,000. 
In terms of governance factors, the third group with the largest size tend to have the highest 
duality ratio as well as independent board and leverage. While the smallest size group shows 
the lowest percentage of all governance variables. 
 
Table 13: Summary statistics 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the firms included in the KFS from 2004 till 2011. The four panels 
classify the percentages of Firms, Duality, Independent board and leverage based on Panel A; Forms of 
organizations, Panel B; Industry classification, Panel C; Survival rate and Panel D; Firm size. 
 
Panel A : The Form of Organization 
 
Sole 
Prop. 
LLC 
 
C 
Corp. 
 
S 
Corp. 
 
Partnership 
(Gen Part + 
LTD part) 
 
Firms 1635 1556 440 1039 206 
Duality  7% 22% 34% 27% 65% 
Independent board 18% 25% 24% 22% 78% 
Leverage 28% 21% 25% 31% 63% 
Panel B : Industry Classification 
 High Tech Medium Tech Low Tech 
Firms 705 1329 2894 
Duality  62% 43% 83% 
Independent board 74% 55% 48% 
Leverage 89% 76% 62% 
Panel C : Survival Rate 
 Survived Non-Survived 
Firms 2007 2910 
Duality  79% 43% 
Independent board 56% 28% 
Leverage 52% 67% 
Panel D : Firm Size 
 0 to 10,000 10,000 to 100,000 More than 100,000 
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Firms 40% 39% 21% 
Duality  12% 22% 62% 
Independent board 1% 23% 41% 
Leverage 39% 83% 87% 
 
To see the correlation between the EO factors and governance variables, we perform a pairwise 
correlation matrix (table 4) presenting the correlation of the employed variables. Showing that 
positive correlations exist between the governance variables and EO factors except for the risk-
taking variable which shows a negative correlation with other variables.  
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
Table 4 shows the pairwise correlation between the study variables including; governance index, 
innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness, ROE, ROA, 
employment growth, sales growth, and industry. 
 
 
 
Variables 
Mean 
(SD) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Governance 
Index 
4.46 
(1.36) 
 
 
0.32*                      
 0.23*    0.17*       
 − 0.52**   0.37*   − 0.15** 
 0.53*     0.46*      0.44**     − 0.45 
2. Innovativeness 4.04 
(1.31)  
3. Proactiveness 3.43 
(1.25) 
4. Risk-Taking 4.86 
(1.24) 
5. Competitive  
Aggressiveness 
4.24 
(1.28)  
6. Autonomy 4.91 
(1.30) 
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7. ROE 0.35 
(0.48) 
 0.17       0.14     0.42*    - 0.21*      0.02  
 0.26*      0.14*      0.11*    - 0.24*      0.12*    − 0.02* 
 0.15*        0.27**   − 0.5*   − 0.24**    − 0.26**   − 0.08* − 0.24**   
 0.57*     0.37*      0.12**   - 0.24**  − 0.23*    0.09*  − 0.11*   0.09  
− 0.08* − 0.13**   0.02*   − 0.20*  − 0.16**    − 0.16    − 0.08**   0.04   0.26* 
 0.04      0.02*     0.06     0.08    0.06*     0.09     0.22*    0.52   − 0.28   − 0.50 
8. ROA 0.32 
(0.47) 
9. Sales Growth 0.11 
(0.32)  
10. Employment 
Growth 
0.48 
(0.44)  
11. Industry 0.38 
(0.36)  
 
5.2. Testing Hypotheses 
We test our hypotheses in two principal steps. In the first step, we test the efficacy of 
governance index in capturing the essence of EO factors. In the second step, we examine if the 
governance index is capable of explaining cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in the 
performance and survival length. (see table 2). 
5.2.1. Governance and EO Factors 
 The first step involves using hierarchical regression analyses; Hierarchical 
regression is a way to show if variables of interest explain a statistically significant amount of 
variance in the dependent variable after accounting for all of the other variables. This is our 
framework for the model comparison rather than a statistical method and requires building 
several regression models by adding variables to a previous model at each step and later models 
always including smaller models in previous steps. In many cases, our interest is to determine 
whether newly added variables show a significant improvement in R2 (the proportion of 
explained variance in dependent variable by the model). 
Before performing hierarchical regression analyses, we follow the four steps 
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recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test the mediating role of EO in the relationship 
between governance and performance/survival. Baron & Kenny's procedures describe the 
analyses which are required for testing the various mediational hypothesis. The first step is to 
show that the governance variables are correlated with the performance/survival.  The second 
step is to show that the governance variables are correlated with the EO dimensions. In other 
words, we are treating the EO variables as the dependent variable. The third step involves 
establishing the correlation between the EO variables and the performance/survival. In this step, 
there is a correlation between the EO and the performance/survival variable because they both 
are caused by the governance.  In other words, in Baron & Kenny's procedures, the governance 
must be controlled while establishing the correlation between the EO and performance/survival. 
The last step in this procedure involves the establishment of the complete mediation across the 
variables. This establishment can only be achieved if the effect of the governance over the 
outcome variable while controlling for EO variables is positive. If all four steps of Baron & 
Kenny's procedures are met, then the data is considered to be consistent with the mediational 
hypothesis. If only the first three steps of Baron & Kenny's procedures are satisfied, then partial 
mediation is observed in the data.  
We first used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to reduce the dimensions of EO items, 
based on the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. Each of the five dimensions of EO is 
measured by three questions, so for each dimension a score by averaging the three questions is 
calculated. The fit indexes of the first-order factors (i.e., the five dimensions) plus the second-
order factor (i.e., EO) fell within an acceptable range (χ2/df = 1.96, GFI = 0.93; CFI = 0.99, NFI = 
0.96, AGFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.07). The standardized loading of innovation is 0.76* (t = 7.92), of 
autonomy is 0.88** (t = 8.43), of proactiveness is 0.96*** (t = 9.38), of Competitive aggressiveness 
is 0.72** (t = 7.54), and of risk-taking 0.62* (t = 7.22). All these indicate a satisfactory measurement 
model. 
Table 15: Hierarchical regression analyses results: effect of governance on entrepreneurial orientation (dependent 
variable: EO dimensions) 
Table 5 presents in 6 models the factors that affect each of the EO variables. Each model shows the 
regression of the governance and control variables on each of EO variables as model 1 on the 
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innovativeness, model 2 on the autonomy, model 3 on risk-taking, model 4 on proactiveness, model 5 on 
competitive aggressiveness and model 6 on EO index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model (1) 
Innovativeness 
Model (2) 
Autonomy 
Model 
(3) 
Risk-
taking 
Model (4) 
Proactiveness 
Model (5) 
Competitive 
Aggressiveness 
Model (6) 
EO index 
intercept 
−10.998** 
−11.619 
 
−8.821 
 
−2.719 
 
−13.947 
 
-1.223 
Ownership 
1.565** 
3.672*** 
 
−0.240 
 
4.716*** 
 
0.094 
 
3.922*** 
 
Duality  
0.086** 
−0.086 
 
−0.099 
 
−0.067 
 
−0.083* 
 
−0.096* 
 
Independent 
board 
- 2.418*** 
2.453* 
 
2.517** 
 
0.809 
 
2.971*** 
 
2.993** 
 
Leverage −0.111** 
 
−0.245** 
 
0.038 
 
−0.409*** 
0.163 
 
0.655** 
 
Industry 
1.469** 
−3.315*** 
 
0.067 
 
3.867*** 
0.224 
 
1.314 
Firm size 0.187 
 
−0.009 
 
0.278 
 
0.072 
 
0.220 
 
−2.893* 
 
Firm age 3.575 
 
5.098* 
 
1.388 
 
−0.105 
 
2.554 
 
−1.768 
 
F value 7.101 
 
5.349 
 
2.639* 
 
4.346 
 
3.898* 
 
−2.710** 
 
R2 0.209 0.342 
0.260 
 
0.420 
 
0.190 
 
.833 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
Hypothesis H1 predicts that governance has a significant influence on innovativeness. 
Counter to H1, the results in Table 5 (Model 1) indicate that innovativeness is significantly 
positively related to the sole proprietorship ownership structure and the independent board. But 
negatively related to duality and industry type. Hypothesis H2 suggests that there is a 
relationship between governance and autonomy. The results in Table 5 (Model 2) provide support 
for this hypothesis, indicating that autonomy is positively and significantly related to sole 
proprietorship ownership structure and the independent board. While negatively related to 
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leverage and industry type.   
Hypothesis H3 predicts that there is a positive relationship between risk-taking and 
governance. Counter to the hypothesis, the results in Table 5 (Model 3) indicates that risk-taking 
increases significantly with board independency. H4 suggests that there is a significant 
relationship between governance and proactiveness. This predication is fully supported by our 
results (see Model 4, Table 5) as sole proprietorship tend to be positively related to proactiveness 
and both leverage and industry type impacts proactiveness negatively. H5 argues that there is a 
significant relationship between governance and competitive aggressiveness. This predication is 
fully supported by our results (see Model 5, Table 5) as independent board tend to be positively 
related to competitive aggressiveness, and negatively with duality. 
In model 6 table 5, we regressed the governance factors on the EO index, and we got 
positive significantly positive relation with single ownership, independent board and leverage, 
while a significant negative relation with duality and firm size. In terms of R2, Model 6 seems to 
have the highest goodness of fit of 83% as we included the five EO dimensions in the EO index 
and regressed it on the governance variables. (Appendix 1). 
 
5.2.2. Explaining Performance: Governance factors vs. EO factors 
In terms of the empirical test of the relationship between EO and performance, results in 
Table 14 (Model 1) indicate that EO factors have a significant and positive effect on performance; 
as four of the EO dimensions tend to impact performance in a significantly and positively, while 
risk-taking turn to impact performance in a significantly negative manner, these results provide 
empirical support for how EO affects performance.  
To explore possible mediating relationships between dimensions of the EO, Governance, 
and performance, we conducted further analyses by separately adding both dimensions of EO 
and variables of governance into Model 3. The final results are presented in Model 3 of Table 6. 
The results show that 1) four of the five EO variables (Innovativeness, Autonomy, and Risk-
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Taking and proactiveness) have significant effects on performance; 2) both duality and leverage 
as governance variables have significant effect on performance; 3) Firm size and firm age have 
significant effect on performance; 4) adding EO to model 2 (Table 6 model 3) the estimated effects 
of the five independent variables (EO) on performance are reduced (Model 3); 5) the estimated 
effects of the Governance factors increased. These empirical results show that partial mediations 
are supported by the data. Therefore, we concluded that EO partially mediates the relationship 
between Governance and performance.  
Table 16: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance 
measured by ROE) 
Table 6 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by ROE. Model 1 shows the EO 
variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect on 
ROE. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and 
leverage) on ROE. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on ROE. 
 
 Model (1) 
EO 
Model (2) 
Governance 
Model (3) 
EO + Governance 
Intercept 1.28* 2.53** 0.15 
Ownership  0.22 0.24 
Duality   .10** 0.11** 
Independent board  .18*** 0.06  
Leverage  .12** 0.01*  
Innovativeness  .23***  0.15***  
Proactiveness  − 0.08**   − 0.07**  
Risk-Taking  − 0.01**  − 0.03*** 
Competitive Aggressiveness  0.10 **  0.09* 
Autonomy 0.19 **  0.13* 
Industry 0.05  .22*** 0.49 
Firm size  0.09 .16** 1.02*** 
Firm age 0.10 .02 − 0.19**  
F value 12.10** 11.23** 12.27*** 
R2 0.46 .73 .93 
Adjusted R2 0.42 .69 .91 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.  
 
5.2.3. Explaining Survival: Governance factors vs. EO factors 
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Table 7 gives an overview of all the relationships between all constructs used in the 
research. Using LOGIT models with the survival of the startup as the dependent variables, results 
show that; in the model (1) of the EO factors regressed on the survival, it shows that 
innovativeness and proactiveness have a significant positive impact on survival, while both risk-
taking and competitiveness affect survival in a significantly negative way. The size and age of the 
firm have significantly positive effects on its survival. The model variables explain 53% of the 
startups' survival. 
In model (2), the governance factors are regressed on the survival.  Duality, independent 
board, and leverage have a significantly positive impact on survival. The firm size and firm age 
have positive effects on survival. Model (2) explains 66% of startup survival. On the combined 
model (3) we regress both governance variables and EO factors on firm survival, the results show 
that all the variables are positively significant affect startup survival, with the model explanation 
of 93% of the survival. 
Table 17: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of Governance and EO on Survival 
Table 7 presents in 3 models the LOGIT regression of the factors that affect startup survival. Model 1 shows 
the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect 
on survival. Model 2 show the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and 
leverage) on survival. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on survival. 
 
 Model (1) 
EO 
Model (2) 
Governance 
Model (3) 
EO + Governance 
Intercept 1.01* 1.04* 0.79 
Ownership  0.88 0.93* 
Duality   0.30*  0.31** 
Independent board  0.34**  0.35*** 
Leverage  0.55**  0.56***  
Innovativeness  0.58**  0.43***  
Proactiveness  0.43**   0.28**  
Risk-Taking  - 0.26*   - 0.29** 
Competitive Aggressiveness  - 0.33**   - 0.35***  
Autonomy 0.36  0.25*  
Industry 0.37  0.38 0.33  
Firm size 0.44**  0.46** 0.47*** 
Firm age 0.28*  0.29**  0.30**  
F value 8.17* 9.23** 11.27*** 
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R2 .53 .66 .93 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
5.3. Robustness Check  
For robustness check on the direct and indirect impact of governance factors on firm 
performance, we used three other proxies for the performance: ROA (table 8); Sales growth (table 
19); and employment growth (table 20). The results reported in table 8,9,10 supports the following 
conclusions; All the EO factors have significant effects on performance; 2) Duality, leverage and 
independent director as governance variables have significant effect on performance; 3) Firm size 
and firm age have significant effect on performance; 4) adding EO to model 2 (table 8 model 3) 
the estimated effects of the five independent variables (EO) on performance are reduced (Model 
3); 5) the significance of the estimated effects of the Governance factors increased. These empirical 
results with ROA - as a proxy for performance - show that partial mediations are supported by 
the data. Which supports the result that EO partially mediated the relationship between 
Governance and performance. 
Table 18: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance 
measured by ROA) 
Table 8 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by ROA. Model 1 shows the EO 
variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect on 
ROA. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent board and 
leverage) on ROA. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance variables on ROA. 
 
 Model (1) 
EO 
Model (2) 
Governance 
Model (3) 
EO + Governance 
Intercept 2.13* 3.27* 0.83 
Ownership  0.46 0.97 
Duality   0.25* 0.19** 
Independent board  0.33* 0.21** 
Leverage  0.12** 0.08** 
Innovativeness  0.17***  0.19**  
Proactiveness  0.12**   - 0.11**  
Risk-Taking  − 0.09**  − 0.01*** 
Competitive Aggressiveness  0.15**  - 0.05 
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Autonomy 0.16 **  0.10** 
Industry 0.12  0.14** 0.32*** 
Firm size 0.16* 0.18** 1.02*** 
Firm age 0.11* 0.09* 0.06*  
F value 9.22** 8.24** 10.11** 
R2 0.40 0.56 0.89 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 
Table 19: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance 
measured by Sales Growth) 
Table 9 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by Sales Growth. Model 1 shows 
the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive aggressiveness) effect 
on Sales Growth. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables (ownership, duality, independent 
board and leverage) on Sales Growth. Model 3 shows the effect of both EO variables and governance 
variables on Sales Growth. 
 
 Model (1) 
EO 
Model (2) 
Governance 
Model (3) 
EO + Governance 
Intercept 2.27 2.39 0.98 
Ownership  − 0.22 0.24 
Duality   .10** 0.11* 
Independent board  .18*** − 0.06  
Leverage  .12** 0.01*  
Innovativeness  0.13  0.14*  
Proactiveness  0.24*   0.30**  
Risk-Taking  − 0.02**  − 0.03*** 
Competitive Aggressiveness  0.10 *  0.32* 
Autonomy 0.12 *  0.17* 
Industry - 0.08  - .21** - 0.27** 
Firm size  0.05* .22* .92** 
Firm age - 0.11 .09  - 0.14 
F value 7.22* 11.23** 8.51** 
R2 0.32 .43 .75 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Table 20: Hierarchical regression analyses results: Effect of EO and Governance on Performance (performance 
measured by Employment growth) 
Table 10 presents in 3 models the factors that affect performance measured by Employment Growth. Model 
1 shows the EO variables (innovativeness, proactiveness, autonomy, risk-taking, competitive 
aggressiveness) effect on Employment Growth. Model 2 shows the impact of governance variables 
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(ownership, duality, independent board and leverage) on Employment Growth. Model 3 shows the effect 
of both EO variables and governance variables on Employment Growth. 
 
 
 Model (1) 
EO 
Model (2) 
Governance 
Model (3) 
EO + Governance 
Intercept 1.93 1.22 0.73 
Ownership  − 0.17 0.24 
Duality   .18** 0.11* 
Independent board  .18*** − 0.06  
Leverage  .23** 0.01*  
Innovativeness  .14***  0.15***  
Proactiveness  0.09**   0.12**  
Risk-Taking  − 0.16**  − 0.18*** 
Competitive Aggressiveness  0.14**  0.20 
Autonomy 0.14 **  0.19** 
Industry 0.35 .36*** 0.44 
Firm size  0.63 .33** .91*** 
Firm age 0..22 .39* − 0.15**  
F value 8.10** 7.44* 9.32*** 
R2 0.31 .65 .85 
While, * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
6. Discussion 
The key objective of this study is to examine the mediating role of EO variables in the 
relationship between Governance and performance; and survival. Our empirical results provide 
support for the five hypotheses presented in the study. As predicted, including the EO factors 
leads to superior performance. In addition, autonomy, innovativeness and competitive 
aggressiveness are found to increase performance as predicted. While risk-taking and 
proactiveness show a negative effect on performance.  
In contrast to some of the current literature, our empirical results suggest that duality and 
leverage has a significantly negative impact on EO factors. From results in Table 5, we find that 
duality has the significant negative effect on innovation, proactiveness, risk-taking, autonomy 
and competitive aggressiveness. The effect of duality seems to diminish when included in the 
model of the indirect effect of it on performance through EO factors (model 3 table 6). Higher 
leverage is associated with lower level of taking initiatives in innovation, autonomy and lower 
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level of ability in identifying opportunities (proactiveness). On the other hand, surprisingly, our 
results find that leverage is positively related to risk-taking, our main explanation for this 
relationship is that the monitoring on most of the government loans and small business loans is 
less restricted, allowing for the entrepreneurs to take the advantage of increasing the risk in a 
hope to get higher returns and growth in return.   
The empirical results also reveal some surprising results. Proactiveness is found to 
negatively, not positively, affect performance. We offered some plausible explanation for the 
surprising results. Although proactiveness leads to higher exposure for the firm products in the 
market, it might lead to negative results if the firm takes it to more risky edges leading to product 
failure thus lower performance. This finding implies that, in spite of product proactiveness 
bringing a lot of positive benefits to the firms, it holds a lot of uncertainty and resource 
consumption. Entrepreneurs should be cautioned on not emphasizing too much on proactiveness 
because too much proactiveness will result in spending too much time in identifying 
opportunities and taking unnecessary initiatives which increase the cost of the product and may 
reduce its performance opportunities. 
It is also surprising to find that risk-taking negatively, not positively, affects both 
performance and survival. We posited that risk-taking might facilitate positive performance and 
survival because resource commitment form top management allows product and process 
designers to be less concerned with conserving resources needed to perform extra analyses and 
redesigns (Chen et al., 2010). However, this perspective is not supported by our results. Risk- 
taking seems to have a complex relationship with performance and survival. Although resource 
commitment may facilitate performance temporarily, there may be negative results in the long 
run when there is a strong proclivity for high-risk projects and aggressive postures to maximize 
the probability of exploiting potential opportunities that may prompt firms venturing into the 
unknown or borrowing heavily (Baird & Thomas, 1985). 
 
7. Conclusion 
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This study makes several contributions to the EO/governance literature, including the 
following three. First, this research advances the entrepreneurial orientation literature by 
examining the mediating role of EO in the relationship between governance and performance. 
We find that EO significantly enhance the link between governance and performance. Although 
the important role of innovative and entrepreneurial activities in the relationship of governance 
and performance have been emphasized, insights regarding how EO dimensions intervene the 
relationship between governance and performance are rare.  Second, the mediating relationship 
of EO between governance and survival is important because this finding challenges the general 
idea that the relationship between governance structure and survival is simply direct. Although 
governance might affect survival, mediating EO makes this effect more significant. Third, it solves 
the debate of the subjectivisms of EO dimensions measured by questionnaires through mediating 
them in the objective data of governance and performance opportunities and taking unnecessary 
initiatives. 
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Appendix 1 
A. EO Variables measurement in the KFS  
Table 21: EO variables measurement  
Table 11 presents the questions from the KFS used to measure each of the EO variables; innovativeness, 
autonomy, risk taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness.  
VARIABLE QUESTION 
Innovativeness  
 
• How many employees or owners, if any, were primarily responsible for research and 
development. 
• Did your business introduce any products or services that were new or significantly 
improved? 
• Was your business founded around a new or customized product or service that was 
created by you or one of the founders of the business? 
Autonomy 
 
• How many owners actively helped to run the business? By helped to run the business we 
mean that they provided regular assistance or advice with day-to-day operations of the 
business, rather than providing only money or occasional operating assistance. 
Risk-taking  • Financial (External Debt/Internal Debt) 
Proactiveness  
 
• How many employees or owners, if any, were primarily responsible for executive 
administration (strategic planning). 
• were any of the products or services new to any market or markets your business competes 
in? 
• Did your business introduce any new or significantly improved processes in the production 
of goods or providing services? Please include any new or improved processes, even if 
your business was not the first to introduce it. 
Competitive 
aggressiveness  
• Were any of the new or significantly improved products or services introduced in YYYY 
new to [ITEM]? b) A national-wide market. 
• Does the company have a competitive advantage over its competitors? Yes 1, no 0 
 
B. Hierarchal regression models used in table (5): 
INNOVATIONij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij, 
AUTONOMYij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij, 
RISKTAKINGij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij, 
PROACTIVEij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi  + eij, 
COMPETEij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi  + eij, 
EO Indexij =b0j +b1j OWNi +b2j DUALi + b3j LEVi + b4j BOARDi + b9j Sizei +b10j Industryi + eij, 
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